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1 Introduction 
 
You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are 
forever attaining it, it is a limit. People ask, So what is this BwO? – But 
you’re already on it, scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, 
or running like a lunatic: desert traveler and nomad of the steppes. (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 166) 
 
        The concept of a ‘body without organs’ (BwO) was first used by Antonin Artaud 
in his radioplay Pour en Finir avec le Jugement de dieu (To Have Done Without the 
Judgement of God) in 1947. While recording this play Artaud was already deeply 
affected and damaged by schizophrenia and soon to be diagnosed with intestine cancer. 
Only a few months after the recordings, he died alone in a psychiatric clinic, allegedly 
sitting on his bed, holding his left shoe in his hands. The play was being banned for 
thirty years in the French radio, although it was broadcasted despite of its anti-
american and anti-religious contents in other countries and it had a deep impact on 
writers and artists from the very start. In this play, Artaud states: “The body is the 
body. Alone it stands. And in no need of organs. Organism it never is. Organisms are 
the enemies of the body.” (A Thousand Plateaus, 175-176) What Artaud had 
discovered was a body without a physical shape, a body taken a form of a deathwish, a 
desire of death (Anti-Oidipus, 21). A body is no longer a body of intestines, but of 
intensities.  
        This description of a body taken a form of a death wish, a body resisting in 
becoming an organism and giving up its organs could have also been found in the 
introduction to Roger Ballen’s (1950- ) photograph series Shadow Chamber (2005). 
One simply cannot name the figures in the series as mere humans, people of hopes and 
dreams, ordinary people living, breathing and just being, hanging around in their 
natural habitat. They are not freaks either, at least not in a way as the people portrayed 
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by Diane Arbus, a famous photographer Roger Ballen both admires and is often being 
compared to. For me the clear distinction between the two artists lies in the moment of 
the encountering their objects of choice: When seeing a photograph by Arbus, one 
meets a figure who is somebody and has a connection with his/hers own skin, a role or 
a personality, a figure who exists, while encountering a figure by Ballen, one doesn’t 
feel so lucky. One perhaps recognises skin, but not the living status of the figure. They 
are neither living nor dead, neither existing nor annihilated, neither lost nor found. 
Their becoming has been interrupted in a most brutal way; they have been discarded 
inside the shadowy chambers to wait for their reason to exist. There is also an oblique 
sense of humour; despite the bleak, even disturbing atmosphere of the photographs, 
there are glimpses and flashes of playfulness, irony and joy, which both give contrast 
to Ballen’s work as well as draw upon it.  
        When I began my research, I didn’t have anything but intuition to guide – and 
quite a long time it seemed that was all to be had. Like many, I could see the 
connection between Francis Bacon and Roger Ballen, although I was at no point trying 
to draw a parallel line between them. I did not want to compare the two artists as much 
as I wanted to understand what was speaking through them in a distinct, solemn voice 
that almost evaporates to touch my skin. We are accustomed to talk about feelings, but 
are we at all familiarised with the notion of ‘intensity’, a pre-feeling reflex on our skin, 
evoking the sensation of a horror before the feeling itself? Are we so accustomed to 
think with our brains that we are no longer able to recognise the nervous system 
talking to us?  
        All the way from the beginning I have considered my role as a researcher to be 
that of the “desert traveler and nomad of the steppes”, trying to trace the fleeing BwO, 
this limit, in a vast, lonely plane. At times I have felt overwhelmed by the weight of 
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the baggage in this Deleuzian traveling. It has been an impossible task to define what 
to include in this work, because the steppe of his philosophy seems to expand all 
around, and to all directions. In my thesis, I will try to outline two things in Roger 
Ballen’s series Shadow Chamber (2005).  Firstly the becoming-animal as a one way to 
distrupt the both narrative and illustrative processes behind the figurative and thus 
attain the ‘figural’. There are three different ways to explore, in Deleuze’s case the 
painting’s uncoded and affective dimension: through plane, color and body. In the very 
narrow and constricted context of this thesis, my aim is to concentrate only on the 
notion of body; the body as a matter that can embody block of sensations, a virtual 
dimension of a body; a body as a body without organs. I have selected six images from 
the series, having an emphasis on the human-animal pairs due to the limited context of 
this thesis: Ratman (2001), Birdwoman (2003), Lunchtime (2001), Loner (2001), Head 
inside shirt (2001) and One arm goose (2004). 
        Secondly I will attempt to pursue the overall meaning and purpose of BwO in 
terms of art as a life; as pure immanence. These topics together will inevitably lead to 
a discussion on representation and the value of photography in general, to which I am 
trying to contribute by pointing out an alternative way of looking a photograph by 
dealing it from the basis of a painting rather than a film, and the representation of the 
photograph from the point of view of immanence rather than of ‘tactile’ or ‘haptic’, 
which would be also a relevant point of view for this study. My aim is to hopefully 
disprove some of the notions in Deleuze by addressing through Ballen the creative 
variety inherent in the ‘art’ of photography. Although Deleuze has examined different 
artforms widely, he has omitted a photograph as an expressive form of art. For 
Deleuze a photograph is a form of illustrating the seeing; what we see are, to put it 
simply, already photographs. A photograph can create sensation only in one level, not 
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in the ‘nervous system’, as I am going to talk about more in the second chapter. My 
aim is to prove this point wrong, or at least to fuel this discussion by offering an option, 
a point of view to consider rather than serving an answer or a solution these very 
difficult questions.  
 
1.1 Roger Ballen: The Shadow 
 
        Roger Ballen was born in the United States, but he has had a permanent residency 
in South Africa for 30 years. He was being exposed to the works of professional 
photographers of the greatest standard already in the early ages in his own home; his 
mother worked as a picture editor in Magnum and often carried home pictures from his 
workplace. (Shadow Chamber, 124) Ballen describes in an interview for the magazine 
Katalog, how in his home “there was a complete belief in the value of photography; 
and particularly in its ability to capture and convey the meaning in a socio-
documentary context”, however adding that “there was a questioning of whether 
photography could transcend its unique journalist potential and assume the status of an 
art form” (24). Ballen’s first hero was Cartier-Bresson, who considered himself as an 
artist while working as a street photographer. It is clear that Ballen shares with his hero 
the strong practical skills of working and interacting with people in their own 
environment while conveying the documentarist style into expressive art at the same 
time. He published his first book Boyhood in 1979 from a collection of images from 
his six year’s voyage around the world. Like Cartier-Bresson, Ballen had mainly 
photographed people in the streets without their knowledge. (Shadow Chamber, 124) 
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Ballen’s profession as a mining entrepreneur in Johannesburg (he has a PhD in 
Mineral Economy) brought him to the rural parts of South-Africa, and between 1986 
to 1994 he photographed mainly the people of these rural isolated towns, publishing 
two books: Dorps: Small Towns of South Africa in 1986 and Platteland: Images of 
Rural South Africa in 1994. (Shadow Chamber, 124) However, during the mid-90’s 
his focus as a photographer shifted radically; his work started to become more 
complex, more de-contextualised and he started draw insipiration equally from 
painting, sculpture and photography. (Katalog, 28) The photograph series Shadow 
Chamber can be considered as the height of this shift. It is perhaps the most complex 
and bleak of Roger Ballen’s works yet.  
        Both Bacon and Ballen seem to have captured the immobolity and the paralysed 
state of Samuel Beckett’s world, from which Deleuze has found literal representation 
of BwO, especially from his novel Molloy which is being used as an example in Anti-
Oedipus. It is true that in the Shadow Chamber there is an ominious atmosphere of 
waiting that reminds of the struggles of Vladimir and Estragon by the road in Waiting 
for Godot. The same existential, sly irony we know from Samuel Beckett is present in 
the shadow chamber. People are not victims; they are actors in a tragedy. Still we 
know them, we know them well. Beckettian play always draws its sufferers close; so 
close are they in their confinement that it is possible to see the blisters in their feet and 
the difficult births of their hours. In Ballen we are at the same limits of compassion, 
cruelty, comedy and tragedy as with Beckett, and Ballen even describes in an 
interview by Heather Snider for Eyemazing –magazine some of his models as Beckett 
characters who “symbolize something that is deep inside the human psyche and many 
people are not sure if they want to accept this or reject it, because it can be quite 
disconcerting” (Snider 1). I think this is one reason why Ballen’s work has been 
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described by many as revealing, sometimes even unpleasant, truth, or capturing what is 
real. Like Cartier-Bresson, Ballen is looking for a ‘decisive moment’, or a ‘significant 
moment’, revealing the truth. In the interview with Snider he describes his work as an 
investigation between the dynamic between interior and exterior. “I hope to create 
messages, with intensity and simplicity that will have a meaningful impact on the 
viewer. A photograph succeeds when this connection is made.” (Snider 1) 
        Ballen’s photography has two distinct dimensions. On the other hand, there is the 
formalist side to it. Ballen has described himself as a formalist, who creates lines, 
forms and texture very carefully. He builds the pictures, works with the environment 
and the model up to perfection. He says in an interview with Robert Enright for Mois 
de la Photo that a form comes before meaning (Enright 1), a very anti-Deleuzian way 
of speaking when heard for the first time, but what actually means that the body itself 
carries the meaning, not the context. It is precisely in this conception that it is possible 
to see also the other side of Ballen, a largely criticised side, which I consider is largely 
misunderstood in him; he does not want to comment on the socio-political issues of the 
South-Africa, no matter how important it is to address them. Instead he wishes to turn 
inwards, unveil different kinds of secrets of the world. When it comes the time to take 
the picture, he doesn’t seem to know, or want to know what happens. He is in his own 
words transforming the heightened energy, the unpredictable moment, when the mind 
is in its most defenceless state and can take in irrationality. (Enright 1) Sobieszek 
quotes Ballen in the introduction of Shadow Chamber saying in one interview that his 
“goal as an artist is to create increasingly complex images with greater and greater 
clarity of form and intensity of vision. The meaning should be layered and reveal an 
asthetic that is [as] ambiguous as it is mysterious.” (Sobieszek, 10) It is precisely this 
mystery that haunts me, and it is perhaps because of this mystery why Ballen’s mind is 
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a brooding mind and why he keeps asking the same questions over and over again, 
eternally doubting the answers. Perhaps this inherent mystery in his works it’s the 
reason why he has said that a shadow runs through his photographs. 
 
1.2 Gilles Deleuze: The Nomad 
 
        For Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) philosophy is above all creation, namely creation 
of concepts. As any creative process, also philosophy is not communicative or 
reflective in nature; it is resistant, rebellious and even revolutionary as long as it is 
creating anything new. “We write for a future population, who has no language yet” 
[my translation] says Deleuze in Dialogues (Haastatteluja, 83), and it seems apparent 
throughout Deleuze’s work that he has always kept himself open to those who have 
worked at the limits of creation, even at the limits of their mental and physical health, 
creating concepts that answer real problems, inspite how odd they may be. By them, 
Deleuze means to speak of artists and philosophers who are often being fragile in 
health or of mental balance, because being a writer comes with a demand of making 
one’s life more than personal, a demand of releasing one’s life from what binds it 
down; an artist cannot be satisfied with a waning life. What breaks these people down 
is not their fragility of health, though, but the excess of their lives, of seeing more, 
living too large of a life as Nietzsche, Spinoza and Lawrence did. They are not sick, 
but special, they are special doctors who can renew the symptoms of old diseases like 
Kafka does, writing in his books a diagnosis of demonic forces which awaits us all. 
They are writers close to signs. (Haastatteluja, 82-83) 
        The following biographical information and list of publication is taken from 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [18.11.2011], unless otherwise indicated. Gilles 
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Deleuze was introduced to philosophy already in the early age during the Occupation 
in 1940 through literature, when his teatcher introduced him to writers such as André 
Gide and Charles Baudelaire. Deleuze found philosophical concepts as autonomous 
and unique as literary characters. He studied at Sorbonne history of philosophy and 
dedicated his first book Empirisme et subjectivité (Empiricism and Subjectivity) 
(1953) to David Hume, an empirist, and already indicated his rebellious and 
provocative nature turning rather to Hume than to Hegel, Heidegger and Husserl, as 
many of his peers did. He continued to study the great philosophers publishing books 
such as Nietzsche et la philosophie (Nietzsche and Philosophy) (1962), La philosophie 
critique de Kant (Kant's Critical Philosophy) (1963), Proust et les signes (Proust and 
Signs) (1964) and Le Bergsonisme (Bergsonism) (1966). Brian Massumi quotes in the 
translator’s forewords for A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze describing his reading 
through the philosophy of its ‘giants’ “as a kind of ass-fuck - - I imagined myself 
approaching an author from behind and giving him a child that would indeed be his 
but would nonetheless be monstruous” (Pleasures of Philosophy, ix).  
        For his ‘doctorat d'Etat’ he published two thesises in 1968: first Différence et 
répétition (Difference and Repetition) then following Spinoza et le problème de 
l'expression (Spinoza and the Problem of Expression). Especially in Difference and 
Repetition, he laid the founding stone in his own voice to his metaphysics that would 
rather be aligned with sciences and mathematics rather than with the tradition of 
metaphysics. He introduced the concept of ‘nomadic thinking’, which he later 
elaborated with Guattari, a ‘nomad’ being someone in a constant motion between 
points, living and existing outside the organisational state.  
        Deleuze met with Félix Guattari (1930-1992), a psychoanalyst and a political 
activist, in a seething year of 1968. Their collaboration was intensive, extensive and 
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they shared radical, the ‘nomadic’ views of thinking. They published the first part of 
their series Capitalism and Schizophrenia called L'Anti-Œdipe (Anti-Oedipus) (1972) 
that caused an immediate scandal and made Deleuze a public figure. The second part 
Mille Plateaux (A Thousand Plateaus) was being published in 1980, which many, 
including myself, consider as a masterpiece. Between these two Deleuze and Guattari 
published Kafka: Pour une Littérature Mineure (Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature) 
(1975). 
        In the 80’s Deleuze began to write alone again first publishing Francis Bacon - 
Logique de la sensation (Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation) (1981) and his 
famous works on cinema Cinéma I: L'image-mouvement (Cinema I: The Movement-
Image) (1983) and Cinéma II: L'image-temps (Cinema II: The Time-Image) (1985). 
He then continued with the ‘giants’ focusing first with the contemporary thinker 
Foucault (1986), which was followed by a historical piece Le pli - Leibniz et le 
baroque (The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque) (1988). With Guattari, they published 
Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (What is Philosophy?) (1991), which remained as their 
last joint work. Deleuze published only one more essay L’Immanence: Une Vie 
(Immanence: A Life) in 1995 shortly before his death.  
        The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze evades definitions: Although it can be 
positioned amidst the strong movements of the postmodernist era rising during the 
60’s, still it seems porous, without a strickt consensus with the fashionable movements 
of contemporary thinkers. Instead it has a strong connection to the traditional 
philosophy and its roots, especially in Spinoza and metaphysics. It draws from several 
sources and comments extensively on societal issues, history of philosophy and art, 
and has influenced in many movements, such as transcendental materialism. 
According to Todd May Deleuze’s philosophy of the ‘difference’ is not the same as for 
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other famous contemporaries of his time: For Deleuze the difference is ‘positive’ 
rather than negative, as for example to Jacques Derrida: for Deleuze difference is 
internal as well as constitutive in things, rather than marked by absence. (May 165) 
This is the heart in his conceptions of immanence, and will be discussed throughout 
the thesis. 
        In Deleuze’s writings prolificity and versatility are not the only challenges the 
reader has to face, but the unique style, especially in the works with Guattari, and the 
language itself can be overwhelming. Jussi Vähämäki mentions in the prologue of the 
Finnish translation of Dialogues that it seems as if the text doesn’t wish to be 
understood, as if Deleuze and Guattari both declare that they want to be misunderstood, 
molested even ravished, as long as the reader spares them of ‘understanding’ 
(Haastatteluja, 7). In my opinion, in the recent history of philosophy Deleuze has 
taken a role of a rebel, a genuinelly free thinker, who believes strongly that the 
philosophy belongs to the future, not to the past and to the hands of those, who can 
work at the limit. It is precisely this playfulness, humility and easyness of Deleuze that 
appeals to me, as well as his acute vision of extremes, limits, and perhaps sufficient to 
say, madness that is inherent in both artistic and philosophical processes. His 
appreciation for ‘the schizo’ is endearing, and it is not a surprise considering this how 
much inspiration Deleuze has drawn from Artaud, and even from the bleak world of 
Samuel Beckett. Deleuze has stated that the great American and British writers have 
talents of intensity, flow and even traces schizophrenia that French writers rarely 
possess, which help those writers to pass on something that can escape codes. The 
French have only Antonin Artaud and the half of Beckett. (Haastatteluja, 27)  
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1.3 An Overview of the Sources 
 
        As it has become evident, although perhaps not articulated before, I have two 
problems concerning my sources. First, when it comes to sources on Roger Ballen, I 
don’t have too much to work with. Second, when it comes to sources concerning 
Gilles Deleuze, I have too much on my hands. For the purposes of this thesis I have 
decided to emphasise the concepts in a certain way; not in order to benefit from it, but 
according what I feel as necessary and sufficient in the context of this discussion and 
my analysis. Deleuze is not only a keen developer of concepts, but also a keen refiner 
of them. For Deleuze, the inter-connectedness and even overlapping of different 
concepts is not only inescapable, but in my opinion, intentional aspiration to constantly 
and continuosly redo and renew the set of tools themselves. The motion of Deleuzian 
philosophy is always onwards, and not necessarily towards the ‘right’ direction. Partly 
because of this, I feel safe to exclude concepts and terminology by Deleuze quite 
uninhibitedly in this thesis. My sole attempt has been trying to keep this study as 
practical as possible, without collapsing to theorising on something I feel is too much, 
not necessary and beyond my abilities as a student of Deleuze.  
        The two main sources I have used by Gilles Deleuze are, first, the collaborative 
work with Guattari A Thousand Plateaus and the second Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation, which both mark the same period for Deleuze. The concepts developed in A 
Thousand Plateaus are somewhat developed further, but above all applied in Francis 
Bacon and in this way the books form a pair together. A Thousand Plateaus is 
notoriously being known as a complex piece of philosophy; it does not only deal with 
the most diffucult notions on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s work so far, but it is, 
intentionally without a doubt, meant to be obscure and porous in its use of language. A 
later collaborative work with Guattari What is Philosophy? is a more concised and 
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especially linguistically simpler commentary through the thinking developed mostly in 
A Thousand Plateaus. The reason why I have chosen Francis Bacon as my tool to 
study a photograph instead, for example, Cinema I and Cinema II, is because in my 
opinion the technical tool of a camera does not interfere with the intensity of the 
artworks, and I wish to start my study from the point of view that it does not need to be 
so. A photograph can belong to both realms: the painting and the technical field of a 
film. 
        For this thesis I have omitted a part of Gilles Deleuze’s works completely or 
almost completely. Although Anti-Oedipus includes a very interesting and important 
thinking concerning a ‘body without organs’ and imposes a very important 
undercurrent for the development of the concept, it is mostly irrelevant for the context 
of this thesis. Firstly it distracts with a complete new as well as difficult set of 
concepts and a flow of thinking. Secondly it mainly suggests that BwO functions an 
opposition to the discourses of the world such as psychoanalysis, whereas I am 
primarily interested in the immanence of the BwO and its practice as a constitution of 
‘a life’. Furthermore Deleuze has addressed questions concerning sensation through 
various forms of art, such as music, literature and cinema, not only painting. Although 
there are many notions corresponding in Deleuze’s thinking on cinema and my 
thinking on photography, I have omitted this aspect altogether and instead 
concentrated solely on the aspect of sensation in a painting. The aspects of Cinema I 
and Cinema II, for example time-image and movement-image are already been studied 
by Harri Laakso in his dissertation, to which I will be referring to in several occasions. 
In this sense I feel that it is a good moment to study the aspects of Francis Bacon as 
well, although in thesis there is no room to compare results.  
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        I have been fortunate enough to get my hands on Roger Ballen’s photobook of 
Shadow Chamber, however, I feel that it is enough because my concentration is on the 
Shadow Chamber solely and the other books are mostly concerned with the 
biographical information and specific notions on the series at hand. All along, my 
purpose has been to immerse myself with the images before anything else; in some 
ways I have felt relief that there is relatively very little information available and 
academic studies made on Roger Ballen. A very important source has been Ballen’s 
official Internet-website, www.rogerballen.com, where a list of articles, art criticisms 
and interviews written on Ballen can be found. The page numbers throughout the text 
are indicated according to a print available on the website, not the actual paper or 
magazine in order to be consistent and avoid confusion if possible. 
        My second hand sources include well-known Deleuze-scholars such as Brian 
Massumi, who has also translated A Thousand Plateaus into English and written a 
‘hand-book’ to Schizophrenia and Capitalism and a collection of essays Parables for 
the Virtual. Ronald Bogue’s commentary Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts has 
proven to be perhaps the most important source to me due to its descriptive narration 
on Deleuze on painting. Bogue has not only proven to be an important teacher on the 
thoughts of Deleuze, but also how to write them down. Ian Heywood’s article Deleuze 
on Francis Bacon has also been an important commentary of understanding Francis 
Bacon: The Logic of Sensation and developing my own thoughts of utilising Deleuze’s 
concepts in Ballen’s photography. Daniel W. Smith makes a very interesting points in 
an article Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence, which I’ll make use 
at the very end of this thesis. Other sources, referred briefly, include Christian 
Kerslake’s Deleuze and the Unconscious and Claire Colebrook’s Deleuze – A Guide 
for the Perplexed. Although Harri Laakso’s dissertation Valokuvan tapahtuma is not 
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used at all as extensively as I would have liked, it has been a great source of 
inspiration and a guide in analysing a photograph. 
 
1.4 An Overview of the Structure 
 
        For this thesis, I have chosen to perform essayist style as extensively as possible 
partly because I want to attain the profound, circular and yet at times mischievous flow 
of Deleuze and Guattari. As an outcome of this thesis, I have become personally very 
much influenced by Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, not only as a student of 
art theory and art history, but as a writer. From Francis Bacon, I wish to preserve not 
only the flow of the words, the mental imagery of describing the art works, which at 
times seems so precise that it feels like the very next thing from the sensation itself, 
but also the flow of the structure, each chapter like leading to another room in a house 
and each room having a certain function, although the house itself stands above them. 
However, the main reason I have chosen the free flow of the essayistic style is simply 
because that is the only way I know how to write about the arts; through associations, 
through a frolic of thought. It is the limit of my own talents. 
        My reading through Deleuze unfolds into three chapters. In the second chapter I 
will try to discuss what happens when encountering an art work and what is it to create 
art that can encapture the ‘real’. This will lead, or rather entwine with, a question of 
representation; the philosophy by Deleuze attacks against the tradition of philosophy 
that has its roots deep in the ideas behind ideas, representation, mimesis, in the will to 
find elements of abstraction, transcendent structures that would explain what is real in 
our world. What Deleuze looks for the world as well from art, is opposite; he wants 
images beyond representation, beyond illustrations, images that can convey intensities 
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that are ‘real’ instead of ‘expressive’. Thus the figuration must first be broken before 
an image can become something beyond it.  In the third chapter I will talk about 
becoming-animal as a a tool to break the representation, or the figuration in the images. 
Becoming-animal is the body where the sensation is able to occur, it is a process of an 
affect turning a human into a non-human. In the fourth chapter, I am going to discuss 
body without organs, the zero, the limit, that is my tool through the virtual, because it 
is a subjectification, too, of something that can convey virtual, something in which the 
virtual can pass freely, in all its potentiality. Body without organs, is in fact, a 
subjectification of immanence. This is the conclusion that I’m going to come; what is 
the result is of an art work, this liberated art work, is not mimesis of a life, but ‘a life’ 
itself: the pure immanence. 
 
2 An Attempt to Locate Sensation 
 
        A photograph is reeling back to a single point of a flash infinitely. However, it is 
only a constant shiver of flickering light that reveals the selfless self of a singular 
creature, belonging neither to a subject or an object, but to a realm of immanence. In 
his last essay Immanence: A Life (1995) Gilles Deleuze gathers his thoughts at the 
hour of his own death; only a few months after the publication Deleuze took his own 
life. In this last essay, some call it a testament, a true metaphysician is revealed; it 
seems as if the very first steps Deleuze took as a philosopher trying to re-read 
metaphysics and invert it to something new, were also to be his last. There are no 
machines, no rebellion and nothing particular new either. It is a swan song to a 
conclusive concept, to a very old concept, a concept towards which I am heading as a 
conclusion in this thesis: the plane of immanence.  
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        In this remarkable short essay Deleuze sums up  his views on transcendental 
empiricism; a theory of the passage between two sensations, a stream of consciousness 
without a self, a “contrast to everything that makes up the world of the subject and the 
object” (Pure Immanence, 25). From this contrast stems the whole philosophy of 
difference as well as Deleuze’s theory of art. For Deleuze, the essence of things cannot 
be understood in the Platonian sense as something the thing is, but what takes place in 
it; an event, an accident, or a sense (Difference and Repetition, 191). When following 
this thought, the essence of an artwork is an event that is being exposed through an 
artwork; an event or encounter or an act of mediation as Janne Vanhanen puts it, 
through which a being is in a perpetual production under the multitude of both external 
and internal forces in a constant shift (Vanhanen 60). This is very much in the contrast 
with the traditional thinking in the Western Culture, where the emphasis has been on 
the exposing the ideas behind things or creatures, namely in the beingness of a being. 
According to Vanhanen, Deleuze attacks especially against Immanuel Kant’s 
categories, which aim “to limit thought to representation” and “to tame difference” 
(Vanhanen 59).  It is in this contradiction with the tradition where the origin of 
‘transcendental empirism’ is situated; instead of turning to ‘naive’ empirism in order to 
locate merely the elements of sensation, it transcends the methods of empiricism to 
look behind and to go beyond, ultimately, the subject (Vanhanen 83).  
        For Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon is a painter who has embodied BwO into his 
painting process, and it is my attempt to shortly introduce the reasons for it in this 
chapter. According to Ronald Bogue, artwork is a being of sensation and its aim is to 
embody a block of sensation. More spefically, the aim of the painting is to bring to 
pass invisible forces and convert them to visible. (Bogue 164-165) In this lies also the 
problem of sensation: not all art can accomplish this.  
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Although I am going to discuss becoming-animal and a body without organs in the 
following chapters, the both concepts work as an undercurrent in my attempt to locate 
a pure sensation. In all these concepts I will try to find purpose in immanence. 
However, before discussing immanence more in the fourth chapter, I will first discuss 
the route art has to take in order to achieve what is needed to give forth immanence. In 
this chapter, I will discuss the problem of representation, and through that what might 
be called Deleuze’s logic of sensation. In this chapter I am constantly swaying 
between two concepts, representation and real. A sensation is cabable of working 
through both, but in order to capture the fleeing BwO, the sensation has to become so 
intensive it no longer works in the realm of figurative, but it liberates the figure and 
becomes real. 
        I have named this chapter as an attempt. It is an attempt because of the vastness of 
the topic ‘sensation’ in the thinking of Gilles Deleuze as well as it is an attempt, 
because it is, in some ways, an unending rendezvous at the beach gazing the perpetual 
motion of the fluctuation of the waves. It is the only proper way to act with Gilles 
Deleuze; to mediate, to exchange, to encounter infinitely. 
 
2.1 The Many Problems of Representation 
 
        The problem of representation is in many ways a question of what is real. In this 
question, it is important to notice the working of difference within everything that 
produces ‘Beings’ in general. In the heart of difference there are virtual and actual. 
The virtual is not nothing: in Difference and Repetition Deleuze emphasises that the 
real is not the opposite of the virtual, but the actual is the opposite of the virtual (208). 
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The real as we think, feel and experience it is something being actualised; there is 
something that exists, has conceptualised or taken form, something we can grasp. 
What Deleuze means is that virtual, the full potentiality of things has nothing to do 
with possibility of them, as Deleuze remarks: virtual is real in itself and as only as 
virtual, nothing else (Difference and Repetition, 191). This is not nothing. Deleuze 
quotes Marcel Proust on states of resonance as something applying also to virtual: 
“Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract;” adding also his own notion, 
“and symbolic without being fictional” (Difference and Repetition, 208). The actual is 
the opposite of the virtual, not ‘real’, although for Deleuze, even an actualised object is 
in constant connection with its virtual as if about to be thrown to the virtual dimension 
at any time (Difference and Repetition, 209).  
        In Francis Bacon the ’figuration’ is being opposed with a ’figural’; an idea that 
according to Ronald Bogue Deleuze has derived to a great extent from Jean-François 
Lyotard’s Discours, figure (Discourse, Figure) (1971), althought the two separate in 
Lyotard’s notions of connecting ‘figural’ with an unconscious. The opposition of 
‘figurative’ and ‘figural’ is namely a question about a representation, and through 
Francis Bacon, Deleuze discusses the ways to escape the clichés conscerning the 
illustration and narration, to “render the figure without figuration”, without turning 
towards abstraction and giving up the figure altogether. (Bogue 112-113) For Lyotard 
the ‘figural’ space is “a dimension of disorganised visibility”; Lyotard’s great aim was 
to learn how to see without a recognisition. Through Paul Klee’s art Lyotard 
distinguished an ‘interworld’, in which either objective or subjective cannot meet, “a 
possible world made visible through art”, in which there are “force and energy in the 
process of constructing its own cosmos”. (Bogue 113-114) This creation of its own 
world is in Deleuze’s terms is seen in his notions of the body as a way to mediate force. 
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The power of art lies in its inherent creativity that is parallel to the natural creation of 
the world; it can locate the fields in which the matter can turn to sensation, of the 
blocks of sensations (Mitä on filosofia?, 178). Deleuze wishes to locate the 
‘interkingdoms’ of things that stem neither from genetics or structures, where “nature 
operates – against itself” (A Thousand Plateaus, 267); he wishes to understand things 
through becoming instead of production. This is what becoming-animal is about: 
turning a matter into a boneless meat, without any sustaining form that can be 
recognised per ce, but of animals peopling human beings through deformation, through 
infection, as I will discuss more in the third chapter. 
        Ronald Bogue raises a very interesting source, for which Deleuze relies heavily in, 
for example, Francis Bacon, namely Henri Maldiney and his essays collected in 
Regard Parole Espace (1973). Maldiney thinks art not as a discourse made of signs, 
but as forms: dynamic, spontaneous and self-shaping forms that are one with the 
‘appearance’ of an artwork. (Bogue 117-118) It is perhaps in this notion of form that 
Lyotard through Paul Klee and Maldiney connect and are furthermore rooted in 
Deleuze’s ideas. Bogue refers to Paul Klee’s words “work is the way”, where the 
rhythm, also Maldiney’s concept, is the “unfolding pattern of this self-shaping 
activity” (Bogue 119).  
        Deleuze begins Francis Bacon by indicating how the artist was enormously 
resourceful in stripping down both the narratological and representational elements 
from his works: Deleuze says how in Bacon's works there is neither a model to 
represent or a story to tell, but by isolating the figure into a circle, ring or a cage like 
Bacon does, the relation of the figure to its surrounding and isolating 'place' becomes 
ruled and defined by 'a fact'. This fact is what Bacon himself refers to as a story told 
precisely, deeply and without the padding: Padding, which Deleuze refers to as 
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representation, narration, illustration – the liberation of the figure (Francis Bacon, 2-3). 
In Francis Bacon, Deleuze ponders hoe this kind of painting, merely sticking to the 
fact, is what many painters have tried to accomplish, for example Cézanne, but what 
Deleuze also aknowledges, has been possible only after certain innovations, most 
importantly photography. Modern painting does not have to fulfil the purpose of 
neither illustrative and documentary role, nor being conditioned by religious rules. 
These conditions have liberated the artists, but not necessarily figures in paintings. 
(Francis Bacon, 8) Heywood remarks that Deleuze’s ‘metaphysics’ of Becoming and 
in the process of Becoming everything, our experiences and thoughts must escape 
representation, although at the same time there must a ‘presentation’ of a sort in order 
to reach our consciousness.  
        In Francis Bacon, Deleuze gives an example of how Francis Bacon conveys 
something that is ‘figured’ in a painting and turn it into a pure sensation. Although the 
figure in the painting is opposed to figuration, something is nonetheless figured in the 
painting, such as it is the case in his many versions of the screaming pope. What 
Bacon does is that he renounces the primary figuration by neutralising the sensation 
from it. This he accomplishes by eliminating the sensational from the primary 
figuration, such as the violent sensation of the horror of the screaming pope by 
neutralising the horror and instead expressing the scream: The pope sits surrounded by 
nothing that might cause the horror, he sits isolated and shielded, and he himself sees 
nothing. Deleuze says he screams before the invisible, and thus the sensation, horror, is 
multiplied because the pope does not scream because of the horror of something, but 
the horror is the conclusion of the scream. (Francis Bacon, 37-38.) Horror is the 
primary figuration of the painting, but because of the secondary figuration, the scream, 
the primary figuration has being neutralised and even renounced. Instead of being a 
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representation of horror, the screaming pope becomes a sensation of horror, an 
experience, which according to Deleuze’s words “manifest the power of the paint all 
the more” (Francis Bacon, 38).  
 
2.2 The Cliché and a Photograph 
 
        The modern painting, because of its own past and the new innovations, also faces 
more difficulties in breaking with the figuration: The canvas is always covered with 
clichés in the beginning. (Francis Bacon, 11) Deleuze refers to D. H. Lawrence's text 
of Cézanne saying that it seems a small achievement that he learned to know an apple 
fully, but still never quite fully enough, like he was constantly battling a hydra-headed 
cliché whose last head he could never cut. Even the abstract art hasn't been able to 
save itself from clichés. The true great artists also know that it is not enough to take a 
cliché and transform it by mutilation or parody. (Francis Bacon, 87-89) 
        Because the white canvas is already filled with clichés, they need to be 
overthrown before an even attempt to begin to paint. John Berger calls Bacon’s way of 
working painting as painting against the clichés. According to Berger, Bacon relied 
heavily on accidents, ‘involuntary marks’ he makes to a painting and is then guided by 
his instinct to where ever these marks and accidents lead him. It is because of these 
marks that the image is then both factual and suggestive to the nervous system. (Berger 
316) For Deleuze, these involuntary marks, or asignifying traits, are what can be 
considered being devoid of any illustrative and narrative function. (Francis Bacon, 5) 
Deleuze explains how the ‘free marks’ are created using an idea of a chance and 
probability distributed on the canvas. When Bacon sees the canvas in front of him, 
every area on it seems equivalent to him, equally probable, even though the canvas 
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itself may seem to impose restrictions having a centre and limits. However the idea in 
painters mind, this prepictorial idea makes the probabilities unequal and furthermore 
divides the canvas into areas of equal and unequal probabilities. The moment of 
painting begins when the unequal probability becomes more or less certain, and when 
this moment emerges, so does the cliché. Thus Bacon makes 'free marks' quickly, 
already in the very first strokes in order to kill the figuration and give a figure a chance. 
These marks by a chance, even though a manipulated chance, are extremely important 
to Bacon. (Francis Bacon, 94) These marks “that will reorient the visual whole, and 
will extract the improbable Figure from the set of figurative probabilities” (Francis 
Bacon, 95). The true art, and talent, in painting for Bacon is not to create these chances 
but to utilise them. The manipulation of these chances is a matter of both great talent 
and art. What is furthermore interesting is the clear separation Bacon himself has 
between of what is 'a chance' and what is 'a probability'. The probabilities are the 
clichés; they are on the canvas however the chance, as mentioned already, is the art of 
painting. The shift between these two is a shift between what is beforehand and what 
becomes after (Francis Bacon, 98).  
        Bacon has himself stated in numerous interviews that in order to reveal the ‘fact’, 
nonrational marks guide him, as if he paints under the influence of a nervous system, 
and sets traps to attain the ‘fact’ in its “most living point” (Bogue 122). In an interview 
“Roger Ballen: Uncanny Animals” for the magazine Antennae, Ballen has described 
himself of waiting, trapping or staging the same kinds of accidents, where “an 
interaction between I do and what prevails at the time” is inseparable part of the 
process (2). For Bacon this approach would involve ‘free marks’, for Ballen, on the 
other hand, the accidents that is resulted by light and the photographic moment. 
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From very early on, I was troubled by the reserved attitude towards a photograph by 
Deleuze, which seems to be an attitude towards an inferior form of art compared to a 
painting. This attitude is due to the very distinct horror towards representation, which 
Deleuze sees is impossible for a photograph to escape; a photograph is being paralleled 
with a cliché. For Deleuze, a photograph in fact replaces the way of seeing: “they are 
what is seen, until finally one sees nothing else” [emhasis in the book] (Francis Bacon, 
91). A photograph is our way of seeing in a sense that all we can perceive, according 
to Deleuze, are photographs, and he continues describing how a photograph makes us 
to see the ‘truth’, no matter how doctored or implausible (Francis Bacon, 91). When it 
comes to the illustrative and representational side of a photograph, I feel that there are 
already many excellent reseraches made to contradict what might be Deleuzian 
accusations, and expand the nature of the photograph. For example Harri Laakso in his 
dissertation Valokuvan tapahtuma tackles upon the question of a cliché in a 
photograph, which for Deleuze as well as for Jean Baudrillard, is something that 
hinders or even prevents seeing the image altogether. For Jacques Derrida, Laakso 
writes, the cliché in a photographic negative includes the aforementioned hinderence, 
but also something more. A cliché, and a photograph, comprises also of potential force 
that a photograph has taken over. It is a matter of time and use, how this potential is 
developed. (Laakso 303) There is something working inside a photograph, developing, 
slowly simmering, as if producing an image within the image. This seems to have 
some connection with the idea of the cliché as a chance to be utilised; a photograph 
perhaps includes the cliché in it, at the beginning, but it is the same unworking of the 
cliché that takes place in a painting as in music or in a photograph. I think it is 
extremely important to notice that a camera does not freeze a moment, per ce, but the 
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event continues to develop also in the moment when the light is working to form the 
image. 
        In his interpretations of the photographs by Jean Baudrillard, Laakso distiguishes 
the role of a photograph as a ‘neutraliser’ in the Baudrillian photography; a photograph 
can stand against a subject, someone, for example a photographer, who thinks she is 
the creator of the meaning in a photograph, and instead erase all meaning from the 
world. An important role of the photograph for Baudrillard is to “pursue exceptional 
photographs” that are something is the “complete opposite of our visual universe” [my 
translation]. (Laakso 194) What Deleuze proposes according to Heywood is that 
philosophy must find ways in which representation can falter, and art is one of those 
events. And for Deleuze, all art forms can attain this, not only painting, but a sculpture, 
music and cinema, too. They key is, that the art can stand on its own and become ‘pure 
sensation’, and it is possible if the artist is able to transform through the choice of 
subject, the materials used and the methods of his art form the work of art into a real 
sensation, which exceeds the conditions of its production and becomes independent 
from the original intention. (Heywood 374-375) In my opinion, this is independence 
much like the pursue for the exceptional photograph in Baudrillard, and in Ballen, it is 
something that has been understood by some, and misunderstood by others – like it is a 
custom in any truly unique art. 
 
2.3 To Work against Representation 
 
        In my opinion, Shadow Chamber has to be seen from the point of view of the 
darkness. The image reveals the Figure enlighted by the flash, but it is the flash that 
literally cuts through the darkness, as if disturbing the forms in their hollow, digging 
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them out. One truly has to extract the blinding light from the images in order to 
understand the original darkness, to which the harshness of the flash only implies to. 
        The simplest, although not alone sufficient, way to interrupt representation in an 
image is through isolation. The isolation in the images by Ballen is not same kind of 
isolation as seen in the paintings of Francis Bacon. The purpose of the ‘place’ is to 
define a space that Deleuze calls as an “operative field”. In this operative field, a 
movement is not forbidden, but it is rather ceased in order to give the Figure a chance 
to be viewed as itselt, as a ‘fact’; an Icon. (Francis Bacon, 2) The Figures by Bacon 
are often isolated in a round area or a ring; roundness often extending outside the 
painting, or taking a shape of a chair, or be scattered around the painting as small discs. 
According to Deleuze, the painting is often being staged as “a circus ring, a kind of 
amphitheater as ‘place’”. (Francis Bacon, 1) Although the round shape may not 
combine Bacon and Ballen, the implied stage within the image does; the image itself is 
not isolated, but the narrative between the two spaces, the image as a whole and the 
Figure within a stage, is interrupted. The Figures by Ballen are often confined behind, 
under or inside things, such as a sofa, a mattress or even a stuffed animal. The surface 
area of the image is often being cut across by transversal coils, which furthermore 
implicate the deserted, fringe position of Shadow Chamber. 
        In Ratman (2000), 40 cm x 40 cm, silver bromide print (picture 1) the shadow 
confines as well as joins the rat and the man together, as is the hand filled out by 
darkness around the rat. It is almost as if in Ratman the Figure is handing the rat to 
Ballen, but this gesture is being revealed only through the light of flash. Instead the 
shadow, now combining the man and the rat together, was what could be seen through 
the camera. In Birdwoman (2003), 40 cm x 40 cm, silver bromide print (picture 2) the 
confinement is portrayed through a camouflage, and a birdwoman becomes the face of 
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the bird in a cloak, combining them together. The harsh shadow reflects yet again from 
the wall, drawing a black contour around the birdwoman, which is inseparable from 
the black cloak. In Lunchtime (2001), 40 cm x 40 cm, silver bromide print (picture 3) 
the isolation is more evident; the Figure is trapped between a table and a wall, which 
also represent the separateness of the Figure from the lunch. 
        The space of the Shadow Chamber is not far from the space of Francis Bacon’s 
paintings. The isolation of the space does not have to be created by bars or rings alone, 
a mere chair is sometimes sufficient to interrupt the motion of the Figure in the images 
of Bacon. The space has an important role in the liberation of the Figure in Deleuze’s 
reading of Bacon. According to Deleuze the only way to paint the sensation is to 
confront the figure and to libarate it, let it become ‘free’, go beyond it. Deleuze claims 
that there are two ways of going beyond figuration: either toward abstract form or 
toward the Figure, namely the ‘figural’ painting as discussed before. The sensations 
that are found only in the body must recorded as ‘facts’, and their realness depend 
solely whether they have been painted as illustrations or representations of something, 
or as themselves, their immanence. According to Deleuze, the sensation passes 
through one level, order or area to another. It does not pass through the brain, as in 
both figurative painting and abstract painting, which can implement transformations of 
forms, but not deformations of bodies. This is the reason why a sensation can liberate 
the Figure: The Figure is a body, not a form. (Francis Bacon, 34, 36) 
 
2.4 The Logic of Sensation 
 
        It is very important to stress, as Brian Massumi does in his notes in A user’s guide 
to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, that for Deleuze the concept ‘sensation’ does not 
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return to subjectivity as it does in phenomenology, although it may take part in the 
level of causality also involving subjectivity. (A user’s guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, 161) Ian Heywood states that the logic of sensation Deleuze talks about 
is about escaping the narrative that “might ‘explain’ it, thus seeking to limit its 
discursive legibility”, continuing that the “practice of defiguration neither encodes nor 
departs from the visible world but ‘modulates’ it, transforms it into fluid, rhyzomic 
scenes of transformation and becoming.” (Heywood 376) Thus sensation acts as an 
agent of a direct contact, an immediate response without conveying into a 'story' or a 
'theory' first. For Francis Bacon, his paintings are about a stripped truth, complete in 
itself, all about the bare, simple truths rather than what Bacon refers as ”tell[ing] you 
the story through a long diatribe in the brain” (Russell 121).  
        Affect is a term often used together with a percept; together their domain is art. 
Affects and percepts form together a block of sensation, what Deleuze and Guattari 
call in What is Philosophy? a basis for an art work, an assemblage of certain affects 
and percepts. Affect is always more intensive than the feelings they arouse, just as a 
percept is not a perception, because it is never dependent on the state of a subject. 
(Mitä on filosofia?, 168) Pure percepts are distinguished as sceneries, whereas pure 
affects as people, figures (Mitä on filosofia?, 200). However, affect and percept never 
exceed the feelings and perceptions, but in my opinion they are the invisibility, the 
inverse within them; as Deleuze and Guattari press affects are humans turning to a-
humans, and percepts nature turning to a-naturical sceneries. “We are not in a world, 
but we become together with a world as we contemplate it. To see, to become are all. 
We become universe. Animals, plants, molecules; zero.” [my translation] (Mitä on 
flosofia?, 174)  
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        For Deleuze affect is namely movement, two-way action, the object’s capacity to 
act and to be acted upon or according to Massumi the way “body can connect with 
itself and with the world” (A user’s guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 93). 
Deleuze’s view on affect’s two-fold quality is derived from Spinoza, as already 
mentioned, it is a constitution of the world; things have forces in them and there are 
forces acting on them and according to Vanhanen “affects accompany the actualisation 
of the world into discrete individuals” (Vanhanen 63) In fact, as Deleuze and Guattari 
put it, affect, percept and sensation are themselves creatures that exist in the absence. 
When either painted, captured, sculpted or written down the ‘human’ becomes already 
an assemblage of affects and percepts. (Mitä on filosofia?, 168-169) 
        To paint forces is the eternal mission of a painter, this is what Deleuze has 
already discussed throughly in Francis Bacon, where he indicates the close 
connectedness of a force and a sensation: “for a sensation to exist, a force must be first 
exerted on a body, on a point of a wave”, although he furthermore points out that “the 
sensation ‘gives’ something completely different from the forces that condition it” 
(Francis Bacon, 56). Thus the power of the art work is the same as the power in 
philosophy: to create new things. Whereas philosophy aims to create new concepts, art 
creates affects when a sensation occurs in a material, and the material can be transfered 
into a sensation (Mitä on filosofia?, 196-197) 
        Deleuze writes the Bacon’s figures go at the very limit of the lived body, beyond 
the organism, releasing only intensive reality through them. According to Deleuze 
Antonin Artaud and Francis Bacon meet especially how the sensation is being 
produced on the body. When the body is being dismantled so that it favours the body 
instead of the organism or the head instead of the face, a body can be seen as mere 
flesh and nerve, in which a wave flows or vibrates through and traces levels upon it. 
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When this wave meets with forces acting on the body, it creates a sensation that no 
longer is representative, but real. (Francis Bacon, 45) It is this sensation I am trying to 
locate in the next two chapters, first in third chapter in the context of the body, the 
matter, the solid flesh through becoming-animal and then, in the fourth chapter as 
bodies without organs, as pure intensity, as itself. 
 
3 Entering the Interkingdom: Becoming-animal in Shadow Chamber 
 
        In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari say that “becoming is 
involutionary, involution is creative” (263). This small remark is in my opinion in the 
heart of Deleuze’s notions on art. The world, as well as the art, is to become, but in 
order to become, one cannot use force, or forcefully enter into a state of becoming. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, one is able to mediate forces, encounter them 
gracefully, give room for them to take the lead, but the truth is, there are so many 
forces acting and reacting that nothing is to be done; the evolution for Deleuze and 
Guattari is ‘involution’, something spiraling inwards, entangling and interweaving.  
        To paint the sensation and harnest the aforementioned forces, one must be able to 
paint the body where the sensation is able to occur. However, in order to paint the 
body, one must first be able to know the difference between the ‘body’ and the ‘object’, 
or a figural and a figurative. In order to interrupt the processes of representation, I have 
chosen the way of an animal, becoming-animal as a tool to reduce the flesh of the 
figure to a meat, a mere matter where an affect can take a power to exist and to 
preserve in. In this chapter, the way to a BwO thus goes through a shadowy zoo, 
because as Deleuze and Guattari says, all art begins from an animal, because it is 
‘meat’ that can reveal affects and at the moment of the revelation, disappear under the 
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block of the sensation (Mitä on filosofia?, 187). The purpose of becoming-animal is in 
the process of an affect turning a human into a non-human, and vice versa: it is in this 
process of a non-human becomings that affect comes to pass freely, in contrast to the 
nonhuman landscapes of nature where the percept arises from (Bogue 164).  
        Becoming-animal is not a production of identification, reproduction, or even 
looking alike, but rather a production of random coincidences and transference; two 
different breeds captured in a same mirage, conjoined by the light revealing them, 
sharing and changing each other in the process. Affect itself is the final point in the 
infinity before the natural separation of two creatures. (Mitä on filosofia?, 177-178) 
The purpose of art, or perhaps the power of art, is that it can create these planes, where 
one can slip into another; where the animal cannot be separated from a human, and 
neither to be recognised. In this chapter, I am looking at becoming-animal through 
different aspects, trying to reveal the meat under the flesh, the head under the face, the 
affect working for the sensation. Before digging into becoming-animal, I will first 
introduce shortly the philosophy of becoming in Deleuze and Guattari. 
 
3.1 Becoming 
 
        The only way to locate the ‘interkingdoms’ of things, where nature operated 
against itself as mentioned in the previous chapter, is to understand what Deleuze 
means by becoming. For Deleuze and Guattari the world is not a static Being, but a 
dynamic process of Becoming, which has a strong connection to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
concept ‘world-as-becoming’. Vanhanen states that Deleuze and Guattari build a 
theory of constant movement, the change in a state of expressive and dissolving 
individuations, a theory of becoming. In this theory of ‘corporeality’, of materiality, 
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the process of turning the abstract virtual into a concrete actual is due to the variation, 
alternation and changes in matter that is being caused by the dynamic processes, 
pulsating expression and dissolvement, rather than formal essentiality and perceived 
thinghood. (Vanhanen 61-62) This connection between organisation of a matter and 
emergence Èric Alliez has developed into a ‘Deleuzian’ equation: “CONSTRUCTION 
= EXPRESSION = BECOMINGS” (Alliez 147). With this equation Alliez wants to 
point out there is not a Becoming without movement between the two, namely form 
and expression, which constitutes becoming, the world. It is this difference, this 
difference machine that creates new things, concepts, individuals – and pieces of art. It 
is the philosophy of Deleuze as well as Guattari: the philosophy of difference, the 
production of the new. 
        The early works of Gilles Deleuze have two strong themes in it, which Janne 
Vanhanen has pointed out in his dissertation. The first takes base on Deleuze’s 
readings of Kant and Hume, which boils down to the question of the nature of 
subjectivity, as already mentioned. The second, of which is a special interest for me in 
this thesis is the process of individuation through differentation. (Vanhanen 59-60). 
The process of individuation is a two-way open-end process: As one changes, one also 
creates change to the surrounding. Individuation is full of factors of change, coincidice 
and accidents beyond control; it is fluctuation, like waves taking a shape of the rock on 
a shore, never-stopping, corroting the rock at the same time, sometimes in a strong 
wind, sometimes in a dead calm. In this differentiation percepts work as forces and 
affects as becomings.  
        For Vanhanen the mediation or the encounter is the basis of ‘us’ as well as the 
world: we are being formed in a throbbing movement of tension and release. 
“Experience does not appear to “us” as something external. It is rather so that we are 
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constituted along the unfolding of experience” (Vanhanen 59). Vanhanen has traced 
the dynamic individuation process back to Gilbert Simondon, to whom Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to in A Thousand Plateaus: Simondon suggests that individual should be 
adressed as ‘a becoming’, through ontogenesis. It is not relevant to look at the mere 
being, as in traditional metaphysics, but what is the process of becoming an individual, 
something that has not existed before, of falling out of step with themselves. As 
already suggested by Simondon, the becoming always happens in a context. Deleuze 
and Guattari started to develop the concept of territory already in the Anti-Oedipus, 
although it wasn’t being developed fully until in A Thousand Plateaus as a 
territoriality of art, where territory and affect is connected. In the territoriality of art the 
intensities take place on an affective-level. In an affect, also intensities can change 
position and flow: affect is not an emotion, a feeling, but it exists before them. A fear 
enters us; and before we can ‘feel’ fear we have shuttered, our body has encountered 
the intensity of a fear. A territory, according to Vanhanen, “is not the privilege of 
human beings” (Vanhanen 74), and indeed, when it comes to artists such as Francis 
Bacon or Roger Ballen, this is especially true, as I will discuss in the fourth chapter in 
the context of violence. 
 
3.2 Becoming-animal: Figures Falling out of Step with Themselves 
 
        The Figures in Shadow Chamber are indeed falling out of step with themselves, 
as Simondon describes the event of the whole process of becoming an individual. 
Furthermore, the Figures in Ballen are somehow stripped down from ‘human’ 
aspirations and ambitions, and instead are as if reacting to stimuli in a strange, non-
human environment. 
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        The following narrative helps me to guide through Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
thinking on becoming animal throughout this chapter. In this narrative Deleuze and 
Guattari gives an example of one becoming in A Thousand Plateaus: In a horror film 
Willard (1972) directed by Daniel Mann, the protagonist Willard lives with his dog-
like mother in a very authoritarian and oidipal surroundings. Willard is asked to 
destroy a litter of rats; however he saves some, and becomes to like, appreciate and 
spend more and more time with the intelligent principal rat Ben and his companion, a 
white rat. After Willard’s mother dies, Willard is in risk to lose the familyhouse to a 
businessman, so he takes his pack of rats, already multiplied in number, and leads 
them to his house, where the businessman dies a terrible death. The white rat, however, 
dies during the events, and the prodigious rat Ben, Willard’s friend, turns into his 
enemy. At this point, Deleuze says, there is a pause in Willard’s becoming a rat: he 
tries to cling to his human nature, tries to even date a woman, who only has a 
resemblance to a rat (but in the end is a human, not a rat). One day Ben shows up at 
the woman’s house and Willard tries to drive him away, but instead he ends up driving 
the woman, his possible saviour away. In the end, Ben leads Willard to a basement, 
where a pack of rats is waiting for him to shred him to pieces. (A Thousand Plateaus, 
257) 
        When considering, what is the purpose of becoming-animal, the answer I am 
going to give is simple: It is a way for the Figure to embody forces and to reveal them 
in a material form that allows the Figure to escape from itself, “to melt into a 
molecular texture” (Francis Bacon, 27). It is a phase before becoming-imperceptible, 
which means the disappearance of the Figure altogether. For Bacon this means 
deformations, the bodily, the static, happening at one place, instead of transformations, 
the abstract, the dynamic in a painting. In deformations, the abstract becomes 
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subjected to Figure, and the movement is subjected to a force. (Francis Bacon, 59) It is 
a way of the Figure; a way for the Figure to reduce to meat under, on the surface, of 
the circulating forces of the BwO. What BwO gives forth is a plane of consistency, but 
becoming-animal is a one way to embody it, turn it into a Figure; tame it into one 
place. In Shadow Chamber, both aspects are happening at the same time: The dynamic 
becomes a static body, and the bodies, no matter how ‘vivid’, are subjected to the 
forces, resulting to a tension between movement and immobility. 
        In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari begin their pondering on 
becoming-animal through categories given in the past. When considering the natural 
history and its way of conceiving the relationships between animals, they often come 
in two forms: series and structure. In a series the analogy of proportion is the principle 
behind the idea of progression of a resemblance: a resembles b, b resembles c, and so 
on.  In a structure, the analogy is formed through proportionality: a is to b what c is to 
d. According to Deleuze and Guattari the series can be easily seen as rational and 
studious; it aims to fill ruptures, evaluate the resemblances thoroughly and take into 
account possible changes whereas the latter, the analogy through structure requires 
different kind of imagination, namely understanding and discovering independent 
variables that correlate with each other through stucture. In other words, in the case of 
nature the analogy is seen through mimesis; imitation either through resemblance in a 
series or structure. (A Thousand Plateaus, 258-259)  
        Deleuze and Guattari criticise the psychoanalysts of misunderstooding animals 
purely as Oedipal figures, as Kerslake notices, too, proposing that the juxtapositioning 
of the Jungian and Lévi-Strauss’ views as two opposite approaches of symbolisim 
concerning an animal, other emphasising the external resemblances whereas other 
focuses on structural analogies only (Kerslake 170-171). Although it is possible to 
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study becomins through a set of relations, there is also another way to express 
becoming-animal, according to Deleuze and Guattari a more secret underground way, 
what they call the way of the sorcerer, a becoming expressed in tales rather than in 
myths or rites (or in the nature). For them, becoming is not playing an animal, or an 
imitation; it is not resemblance, it does not happen in the imagination, because it does 
not produce anything other than itself. It is not the points the becoming passes through 
that define becoming, but becoming itself; in the case of becoming-animal, it does not 
necessarily require the animal at all to become real. It is real. (A Thousand Plateaus, 
262-263) It is an involuntary, not evolutionary act, in because of this ‘involution’, 
becoming is a very creative act far from regression: “To regress is to move in the 
direction of something less differentiated. But to involve is to form a block that runs its 
own line “between” the terms in play and beneath assignable relations” (A Thousand 
Plateaus, 263). As Brian Massumi reminds, the bodies transforming are defined in a 
sense by what remains the same, their ‘self-identity’, their generality when compared 
to other similar bodies. A paw of a dog translates to a certain degree a hand of a man, 
but alone this similarity does not constitute a becoming-animal. (A user’s guide to 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 96-97) It is furthermore a tension between being and 
becoming, “an equilibrium-seeking system at a crisis point”, which is not completely 
denied of a choice (A user’s guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 94-95). This is the 
case of Willard who chooses, in the end, to become a rat. 
        In Lunchtime, the Figure takes the form of a non-human, an animal, because he 
seems to have forgotten the human way of eating. It is a lunch time, the table is set, 
however the Figure does not seem to be at all interested in the ‘act’ of eating, the 
habits and ceremonies that are involved in the eating on the table. Instead the Figure is 
looking in the other way and seems to be engaged to another ‘time’, maybe even a 
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time after the lunch, cleaning his teeth. The photograph offers two dimensions, two 
planes; one separated by the table, the lunch, and the other separated by the wall, and 
the twirling coils. What happens on the table is the event of a lunch; however, this 
event does not seem to extend its invitation to the other side of the table. The lunch 
itself is almost as if it was a display of a lunch to a cat. This gives a very interesting 
dimension to the Figure; if the Figure indeed was a cat, it is no wonder why he does 
not know how to eat his lunch sitting on a chair.  
        According to Heywood, the bodies and human figures in Bacon are in a constant 
strange, but specific motion, as if they are trying to “take leave of themselves through 
one of their organs, in particular, trough secretions associated with sex, vomit and 
excrement” (Heywood 376). The movement of Bacon’s figures is consists less of 
displacement within the painting, but the confinement , the ring or the round area, 
forces them to a movement what Deleuze calls ‘daily rounds’. These amoeba-like 
explorations of the figures Deleuze connects to Samuel Beckett’s characters, which are 
forced to wait and roam in isolation, too. There are rather invisible forces working in a 
body than a body moving, ‘immobility beyond movement’, in Deleuze’s words. 
(Francis Bacon, 40-41.) It is this disruption in movement that opens up a way for the 
affects to work through; the disconnectedness of a Figure to an event, such as in 
Lunchtime, somehow opens up a new dimension, a dimension of an organ: the mouth. 
It almost seems that the Figure tries to, as Heywood puts, take leave of itself through 
his ‘lunchtool’. He is pulling his mouth, as if trying to extract the mouth from the 
event of a lunch, and through it, extract himself from the organisation of human rituals 
of eating as well as the organisation of organs. 
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3.3 Packs and Litters: A Visit at the Fringe 
 
        The packs or groups of animals are not a result of evolution, but of involution as 
discussed before. They do not share a common ancestor, but rather form an 
interkingdom of unnatural combinations and participations. This is because, Deleuze 
and Guattari say, the packs multiply, develop and transform in through contagion, not 
through heredity or descending from a specific generation. Contagion is at the same 
time “an animal peopling, and the propagation of the animal peopling of the human 
being.” (A Thousand Plateaus, 266-267). Becoming-animal is a result of contagion, 
but not only contagion. It is also about a choice, as in Willard’s case, a choice between 
driving away the (wo)man or the rat. Deleuze and Guattari separates three types of 
animals: individuated animals, animals with attributes and demonic animals. In short, 
individuated animals are domestic animals or someone with a personal history, ‘my 
cat’, ‘my rat’, which turn people around them somehow regressed and narcistic about 
their own selves. Animals with attributes are State animals: they have a genus, a 
classification, a niche, a category or in myths animals which have divine qualities. 
Demonic animals are animals, which form a pack, a swarm, an affect, a population, a 
tale; they are the animals of the sorcerer. (A Thousand Plateaus, 265-266) 
        The animals inhabiting Shadow Chamber do not belong to a single species, but 
many, and thus create a very powerful atmosphere in the rooms. I would place these 
animals to the third category of the animals described above, the demonic animals, 
because they are form the population in the Shadow Chamber in equal terms. There 
can be found a certain level of domestication in the relations between human Figures 
and animals, however it is impossible to say how much have the animals changed 
themselves and how much have they caused change for the Figures. In the event of 
becoming, the change occurs in both ways, and in the viewpoint of domestication, the 
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images are not about a Man and his Rat or of a Woman and her Bird, but a Ratman and 
a Birdwoman; the ownership of the one extends to the other, and cannot be separated. 
This is how the affect works: it transforms the human into a-human (Mitä on filosofia?, 
176). One of the most striking images is the tender, yet psychologically charged Loner 
(2001), size 40 cm x 40 cm (picture 4), in which the ‘anomalous’, the exceptional, 
takes a form of a dog. This dog could easily be regarded as a pet, ‘my dog’, a 
companion to which ‘my’ own characteristics would be transfered if it was not for the 
look, the gaze towards the camera and the posture of a man. The dog has the control; 
the dog has taken the place of the man padding its back, and has reclaimed the 
ownership of the man, as if saying ‘my man’ is here, lying. The relationship seems 
consorting rather being based on the companionship between a man and a dog. 
        In an interview “Roger Ballen: Uncanny Animals”, Ballen refers to the animals in 
the Shadow Chamber as “integral” and “part of the larger whole”, being something 
that “is hard to avoid their presence as they pervaded the environment” (2). Ronald 
Bogue speaks of ‘becoming’ as a form of deterritorialisation; fundamentally a 
deterritorialisation of an expression (Bogue 33-34). This is what happens also in 
Shadow Chamber; the deterritorialisation of a mileu, ‘pervaded’, or perhaps infected 
by the animals, humans and excess ‘stuff’ lying around. In A Thousand Plateaus the 
pack of animals can vary in formation from milieu to milieu, or even within a same 
milieu. Instead of being formed by a filiative lineage or genetics, they can organise 
through “transversal communications between heterogeneous populations” (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 263). In the Shadow Chamber, the animals may represent different 
species still forming a same pack; this litter of shadowcreatures. As Ballen describes, 
they have pervaded the environment and spread all around the space and cannot be 
ignored but integrated into the work. These animals are already are the space as well as 
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the people inhabitating the space; they can be found in the walls, lurking around, 
integral parts of the surrounding. They are breeding the people as the people are 
breeding them; and all this happens in the womb of the Shadow Chamber. 
        Returning to the topic of demonic animals, the animals of the sorcerer: The 
sorcerers are witches, anomalies themselves, in alliance with the demon, and very 
much working against the nature-evolution; instead they create “a phenomenon of 
bordering” (A Thousand Plateaus, 270). The sorcerers haunt the things belonging to 
the marginal. In short, they create a connection with minoritarian groups that do not 
belong to the assemblages of family, religion or the State who are open to the 
contagion of forming a new pack. Who are the outsiders, fringe cultures, either 
revolting or oppressed, and the more outside they are found, the more secret they are. 
Who are both ‘anomic’ and a form of deviation as well. This structure of a population 
gives a way for the rupture that can be overtaken by the sorcery, the demon. (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 272-273) It seems that the fringe where Shadow Chamber belongs 
to and it is a happy hunting ground for the sorcerer; the rupture within the chambers 
runs deep. In this sense, becoming-animal is a question of “toward what void does the 
witch’s broom lead” (A Thousand Plateaus, 274)? 
        According to Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-animal is the affair of sorcery for 
four reasons. Firstly, there is an original connection with the devil. Secondly, the devil, 
demon acts as a borderline, a limit, of an animal pack, in which the becoming of the 
human being takes through contagion. Thirdly, the becoming always implies a 
connection with a second (human) group. Fourthly, a new borderline directs the 
contagion in a new pack formed by two groups, human and animal groups. (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 272) It is a two-way process: As the man becomes-animal the 
animal takes up the becoming-animal after a man, and thus a new borderline is being 
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created. Thus it makes a big difference in what kind of surrounding the becoming-
animal takes place; whether it is a fringe, a Foucaultian discipline society, crime 
society, a riot group, or in the case of Roger Ballen, the shadow chambers. 
        As a space the Shadow Chamber is a room of a schizophrenic, as Robert A 
Sobieszek speaks of, referring to the notions of Jean Baudrillard, who charactirized the 
modern ‘schizo’ as someone fascinated by the presence of objects, things, stuff; and 
indeed the different rooms are overcrowded with stuff, the proximity of stuff, the 
arranged stuff (Sobieszek 9). Although the space of the ‘schizo’, as Sobieszek calls it, 
works well for my purposes trying to catch the ‘fleeing BwO’, for me the space of the 
Shadow Chamber contains elements also of a space of a phobic, namely a space of the 
scotophobia, a fear of the dark. Someone being afraid of the dark is rarely afraid of the 
dark per ce, but of the objects in the dark and hidden by the darkness. Thus the space is 
not alone a space of a schizophrenic, but of psychotic. This is the indexical correlation 
that I am insterested in becoming-animal; rather than trying to locate a ‘schizo’, 
embodying an animal, I’m concentrating on the instinctual side of an animal, people 
reacting as if incorporated to a pack, as if a ‘psychotic’, who contains nothing but 
impulses reacting to the outside stimuli. 
        Janne Vanhanen has stressed the importance of the transcoding, especially when 
discussing milieu as a membrane. He refers to Jakob von Uexküll’s study of 
comparing milieu (or umwelt) and an animal subject as a “self-enclosing unity of of 
every individual’s world” (Vanhanen 77). In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and 
Guattari speak how for von Uexküll, the animal subject is cabable of perceiving only a 
limited amount of its environment, and this amount constitutes the animal’s world. For 
example, although a tick’s world is a very limited one, the simplicity of it shows how a 
tick possesses a lot of power acting in it despite the mechanical responses of the very 
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few stimuli in its world. The greatest difference between a human subject and the 
animal subject is perhaps found in the automation of the response to stimuli; there are 
numerous approaches to act and respond to the environment. Compared to the 
complexity of a human milieu, the tick’s responses for sunlight, smells and ‘its 
meaning’ for feeding once before laying eggs and dying reminds how the human 
milieu is as well being formed by the process of evolution and individuation and there 
is the trace of the ‘automation’ still inherent in it. (A Thousand Plateaus, 283) We 
change according to the stimuli, and the environment, and our milieus and 
environments change as well; against this idea Vanhanen sees the milieu as a 
membrane of internal and external interacting in the world of other milieus of different 
creatures, having either predatory, parasitic or symbiotic relations with each other. 
(Vanhanen 77-78) This seems also to be the case in the Shadow Chamber, where the 
relations change from image to image, thus creating change to the milieu as well as to 
the Figures themselves. 
 
3.4 The Face of the Rat 
 
        The automatic response system of a tick is something alike the response system 
found in the Shadow Chamber. However, in becoming-animal it is impossible to 
distinguish the different milieus or different animals as independent thus implying that 
the affects forming and guiding animals go through a single membrane. The stimuli 
formed in Shadow Chamber create paranoids, and they are forced to form packts and 
contracts with others, in a sense breeding their own qualities in order to survive. The 
becoming-animal blocks are very much present in Francis Bacon’s paintings, for 
Bacon’s Figures are meat; part flesh, the bodily material of the Figure, and part bone, 
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the material structure of the body (Francis Bacon, 22). Ian Heywood points out that 
figures in Bacon the human attributes are often processed into animal form; the face 
becomes head when the attributes of the face, such as nose, mouth, ears and eyes, are 
distorded and faded out, as if covered under a thick make-up. (Heywood 376) A 
similar occurance happens also in Ratman, in which there a man and a Rat form a 
strong pair together; an older man with a big beard holding a rat in his dirty hands. 
Strong lines cover the man’s face, whereas the rat seems young and vital, although 
firmly in his hands, ready as well as capable to slip away at any minute. The stern gaze 
of the rat is in strong contrast with the evasive look in the man’s eyes; it is the Rat who 
connects with the camera and rests easy in the hands of a man, who, with all his being, 
‘disconnects’, is in the middle of the movement, turning of the head, of handing the rat 
towards something, changing posture. 
        This man, who has hung the mousetrap on the wall, is a face of becoming-animal. 
Without the context of Shadow Chamber, the ‘place’ of an animal infecting a human, 
it would be much more difficult to trace becoming-animal in the image. “Every 
Animal has its Anomalous”, an individual different of everyone else in the pack (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 267).  However, knowing that the packs forming in the shadows 
are real, the image, a rat and a man begins to transform before our very eyes. It is an 
image that could take place in the film Willard discussed before, where the protagonist 
was being mesmerised by the leader rat’s intellect and becoming-animal happened as 
an alliance of love; the connection between the man and the rat is what Deleuze and 
Guattari calls the second principle of the sorcerer, becoming-animal not through a 
contagion of the pack, but as an alliance with the exceptional individual (A Thousand 
Plateaus, 268). This is the connection between Captain Ahab and Moby Dick: they 
have entered the zone of indiscernibility or undecidability where they have become 
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inseparable, unrecognisible as an individual, as a singular human being, a whale or a 
rat. Deleuze and Guattari refer as ‘anomalous’ not someone being abnormal, but 
distinguished in the multiplicity of the pack; someone chosen as distinguished as in the 
case of Ahab, who breaks the code of the whalers to always chase the pack, not an 
individual. (A Thousand Plateaus, 270)  
        It is the paranoid in Ratman that seeks the comfort of democracy with the rat. In 
the case of Willard, it was the rat Ben, who offered Willard a possibility for a 
democracy in an autocrat environment. The paranoid is afraid by the outside of the 
shadow chamber as well as the inside of it; it is a fear of its darkness. The man hangs 
the mousetrap on the wall; however, as it is in the case of Willard, it seems that the rat 
takes the place of throne in the hands of the man. What is important to understand 
about the anomalous, exceptional individual is that evades categories. Deleuze and 
Guattari define it as a “phenomenon of bordering”; it is the borderline of multiplicity 
of the pack, from which it is possible to gain access to all of the pack. (A Thousand 
Plateaus, 270) It works as a function of reality between the faceless pack consisting of 
symbolic qualities only. For example, for Ahab Moby Dick is the white wall before all 
the other whales. It is this rat out of all the other rats in Shadow Chamber that enjoys 
‘anomality’ and in some sense, a becoming-human. 
        To explain this further, becoming-animal always transforms the animal as well. In 
the case of Ratman, the transformation happens not because of pleasure, but because of 
power. The rat in the image seems to be in everyway opposite to the human; they are 
not joined together because of resemblances in look, but because of deformation of it. 
The rat is eating away the man’s face as much as the man is transforming the rat, thus 
making this image about a face; a face of this man and a face of the rat, no longer a 
face, but a head. As Roland Bogue says, this “dynamics of faciality”aims to undo the 
 45 
face in order to give space to the head; and the face is being undone by revealing 
instances of becoming-animal (Bogue 111). The way of the ‘sorcerer’ begins to 
unravel in the image; the way of non-genetics, alogical orders, compabilities beyond 
borderlines, when “not even God can say in advance whether two borderlines will 
string together or form a fiber” (A Thousand Plateaus, 276).  
        In Birdwoman the face turns to animal more concretely and thus entering the zone 
of indiscernibility or undecidability; the bird and the woman become to share the same 
traits, the same eyes on the face. It is the bird who is slowly occupying more and more 
face, and has almost succeeded in taking the control of the other eye of the woman and 
replacing it with one of its own. It is the woman, already transcoding herself with a 
new skin, leaving the hangers on the wall obsolete and forgotten, completely severed 
from their original purpose.  
        The deformed heads, or the heads without faces in Bacon, become real 
somewhere in between the animal and a man: they share a common trait, not 
resemblance through form, but through spirit and through a common fact. “In place of 
formal correspondences what Bacon’s painting constitutes is a zone of indiscernibility 
or undecidability between man and animal. - - Meat is the common zone of man and 
the beast, their zone of indiscernibility; it is a “fact,” a state where the painter identifies 
with the objects of his horror and compassion.” (Francis Bacon, 21, 23) They also 
give an experience that is no longer an experience of feeling my head, but a feeling of 
being inside a head [emphasis made in the book] (Francis Bacon, 48-49), as it is a 
case in many of the Ballen Figures. This is a way the body, or the meat, becomes an 
icon and the Figure is granted a chance to be viewed as itself, as a ‘fact’. It is in this 
that becoming-animal aims at, and it is in this that it succeeds, also in Ballen. 
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4 Body without Organs in Shadow Chamber 
 
        Almost seven months before recording To have done with the judgement of God 
and officially presenting the concept of BwO, Artaud wrote to his friend Pierre Loeb 
and introduced the concept in its early form at the same time revealing his thinking 
process: 
 
Dear friend, 
The time when man was a tree without organs or function, 
but possessed of will, 
and a tree of will which walks 
will return. 
It has been, and it will return. 
For the great lie has been to make man an organism, 
ingestion, 
assimilation, 
incubation, 
excretion, 
thus creating a whole order of hidden functions which are outside the 
realm of the 
deliberative will; 
the will that determines itself at each instant; 
for it was this, that human tree that walks, 
a will that determines itself at each instant  
without functions that were hidden, underlying, governed 
by the unconscious. (Artaud, 515) 
 
        It is the schizophrenic describing the experience of a split between a body and a 
mind, splintered even more to a body made of organs and a mind of consciousnesses, 
knowing and not knowing, aware and unaware, in control and out of control; waiting 
for the manifestation of the supreme will, a ‘human tree’ for to return. Organs, a 
person being an organism, is a set of functions that go beyond the will, one’s own 
sense of self, a lie once uttered by the unconscious. For a man-organism is a governed 
state. A man-tree is his personal island. The concept of BwO seems to have stemn 
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from the attacks from outside as well as inside; the unconscious and the surrounding 
world. 
        In order to be throughly penetrative and porous, or in fact a proper BwO, it has to 
produce and to give forth a ’plane of consistency’ or a ‘plane of composition’; they 
form together a relationship that of composer and composed, to which Deleuze and 
Guattari give the same power, although they do not name which one composes which 
(A Thousand Plateaus, 559). This virtual plane is a dimension of a single sense that at 
the same time expresses a multitude of senses and all that differs. The plane of 
consistency is in fact a BwO itself, a plane of immanence, a plane of composition; only 
a BwO is a subjecification of the virtual, a body of the virtual. 
 
4.1 Introducing Body without Organs 
 
        Gilles Deleuze developed the concept of BwO further with Félix Guattari in a 
two-volume work called Capitalism and Schizophrenia, consisting of Anti-Oedipus 
(1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). Deleuze returned to the concept again in 
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (1981). A body without organs is an actual 
desire of being for the schizophrenic such as Artaud; this desire Deleuze discovered 
already in The Logic of Sense (1969).  Ideally, for Artaud body is connected with a 
thought, and together with the uncosciousness they form life. However their union is 
not without complications, especially to Artaud. According to Phillippe Solles in 
Writing and the Experience of Limits, thought is precisely something that escapes 
Artaud, up to a point he believes he has forgotten how to think, or as Solles believes, 
he has lost a body of this thought and has separated the language from its flesh. For 
Artaud, theatre is the only place a thought is able to find its body. (Solles 89-90) This 
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kind of materialist conception of spirit, the body of thought, imposes a fact that in 
order to understand it, a sort of language must be learned first: To merely see the body, 
not beyond the body, is in fact not seeing the body at all. The body must be thought. 
The language to see beyond the body is a mind’s willingness to break the forces that 
limit one’s will to think. At this limit of the body is the ‘body without organs’. This 
was the battle Artaud was fighting inside and outside of himself, a battle of  and 
‘uncreated man’, someone without organs, as an experience of someone able to 
become conscious about his uncosciousness. (Solles 99) 
        Deleuze and Guattari deal BwO in the context of ‘desiring-production’ in Anti-
Oedipus. Within the production works the forces of consumption and registration, 
which are being circled so that the process of production is ongoing, neverstopping, 
without a goal or an end that would eventually stop the running processes of 
production. The ‘homo natura’, the universal producer is a schizophrenic, whose 
sickness knows no single entity, but is a process of productive and constantly renewing 
desires: “The will that determines itself at every instant”, as Artaud says above. 
Schizophrenic is a person in whom a production and a product cannot be separated and 
BwO is the identity of this synthesis; an imageless body, only present in a moment of 
production as a counter-production. (Anti-Oidipus, 17-22) It is a trait of a production 
that still senses and repels the desire-production. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari 
writes that BwO transfers the energies of the production and acts as a surface to create 
a kind of transcription energy, which is being portrayed as a sort of indepence in BwO; 
independence against the all the disjunctions of production; independence against 
signifying something (Anti-Oidipus, 26-29). However, in A Thousand Plateaus the 
term takes a more decisive turn towards metaphysics; it is no longer a tool of their 
schizo-analysis as an attack against the psychoanalytic discourse, but has become a 
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notion of ‘a life’ itself, as I am going to discuss later in this chapter. It is this 
dimension of a BwO that I am interested in and that Deleuze himself has examined 
through the art of Francis Bacon. 
 
4.2 How to Make Yourself a Body without Organs 
 
        In A Thousand Plateaus the sixth chapter “November 28, 19471: How Do You 
Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” begins with a clear statement: Instead of 
being a notion of a concept, Bwo is a set of practices (166). In order to make one, 
Deleuze and Guattari continue by asking two questions: What type of BwO it is and 
what kinds of procedures (a priori) will come to pass? What are its modes, and what 
will surprise in it? (A Thousand Plateaus, 168)  
        The different types of Bwo are listed in A Thousand Plateaus. The difference 
between them is in their experience and in ways of losing their organs. Brian Massumi 
calls the BwO as a body beyond any state of being, pure virtuality and potentiality, an 
open system, which reacts to fractal attractors when sending out singular states of 
potentiality. (A user’s guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 70-71) However, when 
taking a form, a body is not a BwO unless it can convey the certain flow of intensities, 
mere existing without organs is not enough; the open system needs to be played out. 
        Starting to build of BwO is not an easy task, and Deleuze and Guattari begins 
with examples of ‘empty bodies’ that lack the joy, the ecstacy, of the full BwO: The 
hypochondric body is a disorganised body that has already lost all its organs, a body  
1 Indicating to the recording date of Antonin Artaud’s To have done with the 
judgement of God, taken place 22-29.11.1947 and to the specific lines: “for you can tie 
me up if you wish, but there is nothing more useless than an organ.” (A Thousand 
Plateaus, 168) 
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for which the damage has already been done, that is prior to the desire of becoming a 
BwO, “a sucked-dry body”. The paranoid body is under an attack from outside forces, 
however at the same time gaining strength from the outside energies. The schizo body 
has been engaged in an internal battle against its own organs resulting in a catatonic 
state of the body. The drugged body desires more efficient bodily functions, adding a 
hole directly to the lungs thus eliminating the purpose of breathing, or desiring a single 
hole to the stomach and sealing the mouth and the anus, one hole filling the purpose of 
eating and excreting. Deleuze and Guattari call the drugged body also as an 
experimental schizo.The masochist body has sealed its organs tight in order to prevent 
them from working. (A Thousand Plateaus, 166-167)  
        I will take the masochist body as an example. There is an inherent desire and 
fantasy that needs to be present in the BwO in order for it to work. A working example 
of the masochistic body would be according to Deleuze and Guattari as something that 
has taken a form as something that contain only intensities of pain, waves of pain. 
BwO is not a space, a place to be carried out, not a form to be interpreted, but it is a 
cause that makes intensities pass. The masochist body does not look for a body in 
order to enjoy pain, but is looking for a BwO that can be populated solely by the 
intensities of pain. The desire of the BwO is actually a plane of immanence of a desire, 
which is not looking to be filled by ecstacy or been created by the lack of something. 
(A Thousand Plateaus, 168-170) In The Essays Critical and Clinical, Deleuze 
describes how Masoch, as a writer, is merely a dignoser of things. He creates in his 
novels an unknown and immeasurable dimension, in which the characters are full of 
forces beyond their personal capacity, or their environment’s capacity to hold in. 
Masoch’s characters take the form of an animal and a human, a route of becoming-
animal, because they need a pact, a contract of getting closer and closer and becoming 
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a union. (Kriittisiä ja kliinisiä esseitä, 88-89) It is a circle of what might even be called 
intimacy; an attempt to reach the moment before the natural separation between a 
human and an animal, in which the affect still exists. 
        Trying to allure desire from it plane of immanence or otherwise obtaining means 
interruption and discharge; in the case of the masochist body this usually means a 
misconception that a masochist is after pleasure by influcting pain to the body, when 
he is in fact paying the price of untieing the bond between desire and pleasure:  
 
“Pleasure is in no way something that can be attained only by a detour 
through suffering; it is something that must be delayed as long as 
possible, because it interrupts the continuous process of positive desire. 
- - In short, the masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a body 
without organs and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire.” (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 171-172) 
 
        There are masochists, pure masochists, in Shadow Chamber. In Lunchtime the 
Figure seems to have adopted the masochist view of the body of sealing its organs 
from working altogether. The suffering in the Lunchtime is hunger, and delaying 
hunger is the masochist’s act. The Figure is touching his teeth with his fingers. He 
might be pulling out teeth, or then he simply tastes his fingers, pressing them close to 
his teeth in order to feel the pressure and solidness of meat on his teeth. His fingers are 
not food, but resemble food with their ‘meatness’, with their texture; the Figure looks 
away from the plate where his ‘lunch’, a little fish, is laying. The fingers of the Figure 
are also his cutlery. There is not a knife or a fork or a spoon anywhere in the picture, 
but the Figure quite concretely tastes his empty tools. I think it is evident that the 
Figure is not eating his fingers, but playing with them, as he is also playing with the 
other organ essential in the act of eating: his mouth. The mouth has been separated 
from the ‘lunchtime’, from its purpose. The mouth is not fulfilling its function of a 
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lunch, but is waiting, postponing the lunchtime: the Figure is not lacking food, nor is 
he looking for ecstacy, but is rendering the waiting as a pure intensity of a hunger.  
 
4.3 The Violence of Pure Intensity 
 
        Body without organs is a body made entirely by intensities. These intensities do 
not move to another merely through sensations as ‘feelings’; they are not feelings. 
They are being encountered through the body; one experiences the shutter before the 
fear; one screams before the horror; one is being mediated through the plane of 
immanence, the virtual network before the logic, the thought, the ‘brain’. This body is 
encountered in the joint unity of the sensed and sensing. Deleuzian logic of sensation 
is essentially the logic of the pure intensity of the virtual, and the painters who can 
paint this virtual are such as Paul Cézanne and Francis Bacon is because these painters 
have realised that the “sensation is not in the ‘free’ or disembodied play of light and 
colour; on the contrary, it is in the body, even the body of an apple” (Francis Bacon, 
35). They are artists, who can paint this sensation and make the unvisible pierce 
through the nervous system like an arrow made of photons. 
        It is evident, even when browsing through a selection of photographs in Shadow 
Chamber, how the clutter of broken, soiled stuff and the confinement of the rooms and 
the walls create an air of a capricious space; anything can happen in this space; 
anything has already happened in the space. The traces of this anything can be found 
from the paintings on the walls or it can be found on the skin of the Figures, whether a 
curve of a wrinkle or an expression of a face. This anything is as much nothing as it is 
everything; in Shadow Chamber one does not see a world, but a glimpse of a wound in 
the world, an opening to a cave. It is this unpredictable anything, the full potential of 
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everything and nothing that in my opinion creates a sense of violence into these 
photographs. 
        I am not the only one who feels perplexed, baffled and in some ways torn to many 
directions when confronting an image taken by Ballen. Referring again to Robert 
Greig, he explains that the photographs in Shadow Chamber “add to the genetic pool 
of opportunity, understanding and feeling. This is exhilarating, though it may seem 
paradoxical that the work itself is bleakly austere. But then, we don’t just extend 
ourselves by wearing big smiles.” (Greig 1) There is a strong polarity present when 
encountering these images. A critic for The Australian, Sebastian Smee, describes his 
encounter with Ballen as “nervous, confounded, unaccountably emotional, perhaps 
even a bit giggly”, furthermore continuing how “these feelings persist when you go 
away. You can’t stop thinking about what you have seen.” (Smee 1) Again there is a 
field of laughter present, but also something more persistent, more haunting that 
nobody really describes with words that leaves hanging in the air. This two-sided 
ambiguity and ‘mystery’ that sticks to your guts, is something that can be described 
through the concept of intensity of an art work. 
        This kind of a mixed feeling is an example of the ‘intensive’. Brian Massumi has 
studied the primacy of the affect in the context of a short film that evoked interesting 
results in both child and adult audience. The results of this study were received by 
measuring different body functions, such as the heart beat, breathing and the Galvanic 
skin response test, which measures the automic reaction of the skin when showing 
different versions of the same short film. These results indicated that intensity is seen 
as an autonomic reaction directly on the skin where as the content of the film as 
changes in a heart and breathing rates. The results clearly show that a content of an 
image are not connected with the effect (indicated by the strength or duration of the 
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effect, or in other words intensity) of an image in any way straighforward logics we 
are accustomed, but with a different kind of logic. In other words, Massumi shows 
how the relation between the qualities and the intensity of an image does not 
necessarily follow some pre-calculated logic, but are rather seen as resonation and 
interference. Thus qualities of an image can indicate a sad event, but as an intensity, 
this sadness can be experienced a as pleasent sadness. (Parables for the Virtual, 24-25) 
When Deleuze speaks of intensity, he speaks of the same process as Massumi has 
indicated in his study of the short films; what happens in the level of intensity is not 
connected to the form in the image or the conventional meanings of the represented, 
but the through the intensive reality it embodies. 
        Massumi emphasises that the moment of encountering an image is happens in 
many levels, and the level of intensity is most certainly something that is not 
semantically or semiotically organised: “The gap noted earlier is not only between 
content and effect. It is also between the form of content – signification as a 
conventional system of distinctive difference – and intensity. –the disconnection 
between form/content and intensity/effect is not just negative; it enables different 
connectivity, a different difference, in parallel.” (Parables for the Virtual, 24-25) For 
Deleuze the sensation itself is made of this intensity that is not qualitative, nor 
quantitative, but carries only intensive reality within, and when embodied, “it is 
immediately conveyed in the flesh through the nervous wave or vital emotion” 
(Francis Bacon, 45). This nervous wave Massumi calculated happening on the skin, 
this wave of the intensity, that actually explains how in the level of qualification, the 
unconsiciousness flows in the realm of autonomous, thus raising a heart-beat, but how 
in the level of intensity, there is nonconscious involvement with the autonomous, 
indicating that intensity is rather an “autonomic reminder”: “outside expectation and 
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adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing, from narration, as it is from 
vital function.” (Parables for the Virtual, 25)  
        It is this intensity that is somehow an essential feature of the sense of violence 
portrayed in both Bacon and Ballen, and as Massumi writes, it passes on to the skin as 
an automatic response rather than through ‘brain’ as a theory. It is a unique kind of 
violence, passive violence that is felt on the spine; in Bacon the horror is portrayed 
through the scream, as mentioned before, not by indicating the cause of the scream. 
There is only neutralised horror, not ‘horrible’, present in the painting, in the body of a 
scream. Deleuze remarks that the violence of the paint is not the same kind of violence 
that takes place in a war, then referring to Artaud, to whom “cruelty is not what one 
believes it to be, and depends less and less on what is represented” (Francis Bacon, 
39). In Ballen, this same kind of passive violence cannot be escaped from, not even by 
leaving the exhibition, and it persists on haunting like it did for Smee described above. 
The whole Shadow Chamber is a womb of this persistent, ominious sense of violence. 
In the image Head inside shirt (2001), 40 cm x 40 cm (picture 5) the child is playing 
with a toy. There is an allusion between the child and the metal gadget next to the 
child; they seem to have taken the same posture and the form exceeds the human 
attributes of the child to the extent that the child has been decapitated. The child has 
been isolated into immobility in the middle of the play by this gadget; his posture is in 
a sense thwarting the act of play, or at least implying a rupture of some sort. This 
rupture could be an event of violence; the posture reminds of the well-know myth of 
an ostridge hiding its head in the sand when alarmed. The child has been caught in 
horror, and although nothing causing the horror is visible, it is the invisible intensity of 
horror that clutches the viewer through the body of the decapitated, play of a child. 
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These mutilations go even further in One arm goose (2004), 40 cm x 40 cm (picture 6), 
in which almost all elements described in this study are present. A Figure consists of 
mutilated elements of a baby doll’s arm, a goose’s torso and what seems to be a human 
hand holding this compilation together. Furthermore this Figure leans over the 
headbord, or the corner of a bed, as if trying to hold itself up and cross the wall that 
isolates it. It is violence that seems to extent beyond everything: time and space. It is 
what Robert Greig would call ominous, if the word ominous “didn’t suggest 
something was about to happen. In the world of these images, past and future have no 
meaning; they depict an unending state of being” (Greig 1). The ultimate example is 
One arm goose, whose existence is as well as its extinction, a formation held up by a 
skinny hand, almost as instantly as hoisted up about to collapse; a structure so 
mutilated, bordered and distorted, it has ceased to be an organisation of organs, and 
become a body without organs; it is independence against the all the disjunctions of 
production; independence against signifying something (Anti-Oidipus, 26-29). 
        There is a separation between the coded and normal production, and this is in the 
heart of what is breeding inside the shadow chambers; referring to Claire Colebrook, 
the relations to mother, child and father are exceeded in the formation of the body 
without organs and instead the mythic earth produces these bodies. They are the 
production of intensive difference, an opposition to any coded forms (Colebrook 130-
131). This is what is happening inside the Shadow Chamber; the Figures are bred, 
produced, diagnosed by the internal forced taken place inside these rooms. They are 
Figures conceived, if not by pure difference, then at least one goose’s arm length away 
from it. 
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4.4 A Life: A Photograph 
 
        Ronald Bogue asks a valid question: “But if philosophy’s plane of immanence is 
virtual and science’s plane of reference is actual, where does the aesthetic plane of 
composition fit in?” (Bogue, 176) In my opinion, the home of ‘aesthetic’ BwO would 
be in the sensation; each BwO brings forth a plane of consistency, which is, in other 
words, immanence. The plane of immanence is a life of an un-individual, belongs to 
no-one else except to itself. It is the immanence of immanence, beyond a being or an 
act; a consciousness that is not referring anything but in itself, a life. It is from this 
sphere that I locate the purpose of Shadow Chamber: it is. It simply ‘is’.  
        Janne Vanhanen refers to Gregory Seigworths division of affect in his 
dissertation: 1) affectio, the effect of one body affecting the other in a system, which 
Vanhanen sees to correspond with the materialist and corporeality side of Deleuze and 
the power of the desire in the socio-political formations; 2) affectus, the becoming, or 
the continuous change and variation in the forces and their relation refers to the 
possibility for a change in any systems previously mentioned, the possibility to escape 
the dominant power structures; 3) pure immanence, “the autonomous multiplicity of 
affects, without distinction of any exteriority or interiority”, which is the affect itself, 
the plane of immanence. (Vanhanen 65-66). In Vanhanen’s analysis of the last part, 
the plane of immanence, is abstract but at the same time real that all actualised 
individuals connect with, because it is present at every moment, this ‘a life’ Deleuze 
whispers with his last breath. Vanhanen states that the broad sense of affect as affectio, 
affectus and a plane of immanence actually create new kind of materialism replacing 
the traditional notion of matter as silent, passive and imprisoned by a stationary form: 
new materialism that can transform itself due to the charges and changes it undergoes 
and posseses; namely in its immanence. (Vanhanen 67) It is in this notion where I 
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would place aesthetic materialism and furthermore the photographic potential as an art; 
an eternal flow without exteriority and interiority, something virtual, but that is in a 
constant connection with the actual. In my opinion, art is change; it is formed in the 
event of creation, but its creation does not stop in its formation, but continues in its 
‘life’. A life, according to Deleuze, is made up by virtuals, in other words, the potential, 
and without being actualised, it lacks in nothing. As a consequence, there is wound in 
everything that actualises; the virtuals that define immanence are whole and without 
limits, but the virtuals in state of things, in us, about to actualise, are inflicted by a sore. 
(Pure Immanence, 31-32) It is around this sore that art takes place, and most certainly, 
also does a photograph. 
        Immanence, a divine presence or something existing within, is one of the key 
elements in metaphysics. Deleuze’s ideas on immanence were formed as early as 1968 
in his book on Spinoza, where he, according to Christian Kerslake, finds the 
immanence of being in the “noncausal correspondences of attributes”; attributes 
without any direction or causal relation to each other that end up to express the same 
entity, the same substance (Kerslake 151). It is movement as well as a constant;  
Deleuze does not place ‘haecceity’, namely the thingness of a being, into a god, or an 
idea, or a man, or inside a world of a subject or an object, but rather to a pure event of 
immanence: “- - an immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence 
of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.” (Pure 
Immanence, 27) When immanence exists within only to itself, one can talk about a 
plane of immanence. It is within itself, not to something else, not in something else. It 
is not found in individuation, but in singularisation, in the singular essence, a life, that 
is being actualised in subjects and objects. (Pure Immanence, 28-29) In this way of 
seeing, the plane of immanence is an even plane of ‘pureness’, where no hierarchies, 
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categories or dichotomies exist. It is the plane that the forces of differentation can be 
viewed against; it is pure difference. 
        Deleuze himself finds the manifestation of a life in Charles Dickens, who has 
been able to isolate a ‘homo tantum’ (‘a mere man’) in one his stories. A character, 
who in his dying bed gets sympathy, although in life he was being despised by 
everyone close to him. While dying, his subjectivity gives away to a life, a singularity 
no longer connected to the individual he was, but to a man who has no name, is neutral, 
equals pure immanence. This singularisation is not found only in the moment of dying, 
but in all moments and between-moments; they do not follow the logic of the 
subjective lives we all live, but they connect with each other through the smallest 
gestures. (Pure Immanence, 28-29) The Figures in Shadow Chamber are these 
nameless, singularised lives. What they portray has nothing to do with the figurative, 
but instead they render the Figures in their singular capacities, whether hunger or 
horror, or something else. They are beyond beings of subjects. If they are ‘mere men’, 
then it is Shadow Chamber that is the real world, in which nothing abides and still 
never escapes. Perhaps in its confinement and relentless, dark womblike sphere it is, in 
fact, the impetus of the ‘real’ world rather than the end of the world; from this we all 
stem from; from this it all begins. It is ‘a life’ lacking in nothing. 
        The decisive turn away from the ‘subjectivism’ of an experience can be also 
considered to lead to two roads, which many of the contemporaries of Deleuze have 
taken. These roads are dealt by Daniel W. Smith in his article Deleuze and Derrida, 
Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought, one being 
the road of Deleuze and for example the contemporary Michel Foucault, namely the 
route of immanence, which stems from the roots of Spinoza and Nietzsche and the 
other the route of transcendence, which is being lead by Jacques Derrida and 
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Emmanuel Levinas, and which leans towards Edmund Husserl and even further to 
Immanuel Kant (Smith 46). In his article, Smith consistently separates and mirrors the 
seemingly similar, parallel notions of the two ‘philosophers of difference’, the 
Derridean transcendence and the Deleuzean immanence. According to Smith, for 
Derrida transcendence is a way of going beyond metaphysics, and for Deleuze 
immanence is a method of doing metaphysics. One rejects it while the other sees 
within the realm of metaphysics a chance, or a yet unused potential. (Smith 50) 
        Metaphysics is an open system for Deleuze. To return to historical questions, for 
example to the notion of ‘univocity’, a singular quality of an attribute, and to reactivate 
them is movement; these questions are continuosly opening and closing in new 
contexts. (Smith 50) I agree with Smith who says that univocality is the “position of 
immanence pushed to its extreme point” (Smith 51). It is clear that for Deleuze 
immanence offers a possibility, which Smith explains through the aforementioned 
concept of ‘univocity’, first formulated by Duns Scotus in the turn of the 14th century 
and later developed by Spinoza and Nietzsche before used by Deleuze to distinguish 
that all Beings are univocal, affirmed by a one single voice, thus breaking away from 
the ‘transcendence’ to separate Beings from each other. God exists on the same sense 
of ‘is’ as does a man, or a flea; it exists on the same mode, not on the transcendental 
mode as something beyond, but as something simply ‘Being’, univocally. (Smith 51) 
This also means that immanence takes a position of leveling the extreme otherness, in 
this case the ‘God’ as something sharing the attributes and senses of any other creature. 
What something ‘is’ cannot be presented or portrayed as unequal to something else, in 
the case of God this means that the godliness of God is not being distinguished for 
example from the manliness of a man through negation most commonly found in the 
heart of theology; all properties linked to God need to be negated because God needs 
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to go beyond them all. As Smith says “the univocity of Being entails the radical denial 
of any ontological transcendence, and for this reason was a highly heterodox – and 
often heretical – position because it hinted at pantheism or even atheisim”. (Smith 51)  
        It is because a being is univocal, it shares difference and includes difference. 
Many have criticised Roger Ballen for utilising the poor economical and societal 
situation of his models; while he is exhibiting pictures of their personal unfortunes in 
the galleries around the world, at the same time these people are not benefitting from 
his success. In Harri Laakso’s opinion a photograph, or a document, never speculates 
on its own, but is something that is being speculated upon (Laakso, 177). It seems 
more than accurate notion when considering the response Ballen has received. In The 
Photograph as Contemporary Art, Charlotte Cotton suggests that the shift of Ballen’s 
photography to a more ”aesthetic and depolitized” was looked upon as unfit to post-
apartheid South Africa, especially when it contained a black-and-white style strongly 
referring to the traditional ‘documentary’ role of a photograph (Cotton 188). Although 
I am not concentrating on the social dimension of Ballen’s work in this study, it is 
important to notice the extent of detachment of traditional ‘expression’ and the 
production of ‘meaning’ in his photographs; it is as if instead of taking a complete 
picture of what ‘exists’, he concentrates on revealing signs [in here I’m not using the 
word ‘sign’ in any semiotic, or in any other context that should be aware of] of some 
‘existence’ whether present in the room or not.  This is also what Charlotte Cotton sees 
in Ballen: rather than trying to point out personal set of values, Ballen draws out forms 
in his photography, and is in Cotton’s opinion, more closely connected with a 
monochromatic drawing than a photograph’s own tradition and social history (Cotton 
188).  
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        If one wishes to find ethics from the images, they should not be searched from 
socio-politics, the envinronment the Figures do not necessarily belong or wish to 
belong to, but from the univocality of Beings; whether a god, a man or a flea, where 
the ‘is’ in its equal terms connects them to the world. Whether appropriate or not, it is 
my personal favourite image Loner that embodies this univocity the best; it is the ‘is’, 
not the degree of God, a dog or a man that prevails, even in Shadow Chamber. Smith 
makes a wonderful conclusion about the ethics and immanence; it is transcendence 
that poses the moral dimension of the responsibility to the other, which is, in the end, 
“impotence raised to infinity”, while immanence is able to answer to the demand of 
“what can I do”. It is perhaps because of this reason why the philosophers of 
immanence are not only being accused of atheisim, but as well immoralism. (Smith 
62-63) Both immanence and transcendence are valuable aspects, but it is, as Smith 
quotes Deleuze, immanence that “takes upon itself all the dangers that philosophy 
must confront, all the condemnations, persecutions and repudiations that it undergoes” 
(Smith 62).  
        According to Ian Heywood, the art theory of Deleuze, and Guattari does not aim 
to only yield art under the forces of a word (the concept), but to reveal and seek out 
diversity, tensions, deviations, dislocations in the ordering powers between the two. If 
the truth is seen, as it has been seen from the days of Descartes, to be revealed in 
images that can represent with clarity their mental or physical other, it is not a surprise 
that the power structures revealed in painting such as those of Francis Bacon portray 
meaning that can be considered dubious, at the very least. As Heywood says: “It is 
these literally unsettling moments that provide an encounter with what our modernized 
life seeks above all to tame or exclude: the formless but liberating forces of desire, the 
unconscious, the unrepresentable, the other.” (Heywood 372) It is as if the images by 
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Roger Ballen were being perceived through a Descartian glass by some: Is it because 
they are not hiding behind abstraction, or the paint, but they are not only clear and 
unprohobited but also portrayed through the medium of light, the very tool of sense 
and truth, that these photographs are seen as somehow portraying what is real and 
politically (in)correct?. Instead, in my opinion, they are aimed to do the opposite. They 
are trying to untame the other, the real other, the other that disturbs us so much. It is 
not the great otherness of transcendence, but the otherness inherent in Deleuzian 
difference, a potentia and a force in the creation of things, the univocal that speaks in 
these images, and makes them, in my opinion, real in ways beyond the possibilities of 
documentary photography.  
        In my opinion, Deleuze dreads the word ‘reality’ and that is perhaps the reason 
why he is so apprehensive towards a photograph. It is Sobieszek who remarks: “The 
novelist creates worlds from language, the photographer fashions realities using 
images, an act that may be far more disconcerting, disturbing and radical” (Sobieszek, 
10). Although Deleuze reviews an art work from the composition of its aesthetic level, 
it is in, or perhaps within the aesthetic level where the technical level also gets 
absorbed. Thus the techinal does matter; it is in the techical where the block of 
sensation can mediate through as well as with it. (Mitä on filosofia?, 199) It does 
trouble me that Deleuze sees the photograph as a lost cause, while at the same time 
stating that just about any art form can turn on a sensation, “make it vibrate” (Mitä on 
filosofia?, 173). It seems that for Deleuze, a photograph has mainly a single role, that 
of ‘illustrating’, ‘narrating’, in other words, as a tool to illustrate a newspaper. This 
kind of an attitude feels strange to me, especially because Deleuze seems 
unconventional in so many ways.  
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        I do not necessarily disagree with the fear of Deleuze concerning a photograph: 
our way of seeing, despite how factual or fictional is the outcome, is ‘photographic’, 
we ourselves make it. However, I do disagree with the underlying thought that a 
photograph would somehow be inferior to a painting as an artform. I am not sure if I 
am equipped to answer to this challenge in other way than through Roger Ballen, who 
has proven throughout this thesis that his medium is not only light, but shadow. It is in 
shadow where the difference acts and reacts as endlessly as in waves; as a headstrong 
adversary of light. It is in this I agree with Deleuze: “The struggle with the shadow is 
the only real struggle” (Francis Bacon, 62). 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
        Throughout this thesis I have tried to demonstrate that a photograph is able to 
work from and within the circumstances as does, for example, a painting. It has not 
been my intention to draw a parallel line between a painting and a photograph, 
between Francis Bacon or Roger Ballen, but to discuss the ways they both, in their 
independent ways, aim to create art that is beyond what is expected of them.  
        Francis Bacon is an artist who has been enormously resourceful of stripping down 
narratological and representational elements from his paintings. It is the aim of the 
painting is to bring to pass invisible forces and convert them to visible, namely to 
embody a body without organs. A being is in a perpetual production under the 
multitude of both external and internal forces in a constant shift; even a being of 
sensation, namely an artwork, is in a constant shift while trying to embody a block of 
sensation, namely affects and percepts. In this lies also the problem of sensation: not 
all art can accomplish this embodiment.  The Deleuzian logic of sensation boils down 
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to ‘freeing’ the Figure; becoming a fact, an Icon, which resembles only itself. It is in 
this process I have tried to contribute by offering another point of view, and in this I 
feel like I have succeeded; there are glimpses of bodies without organs in Shadow 
Chamber, and furthermore, it is the interkingdom of Shadow Chamber itself that 
participates in producing them, not necessarily a photographer nor his medium alone. 
Roger Ballen has given much power to the unconscious to work in his images, 
although he is a formalist and an artist with a enormously acute senses and vision; 
there is not ‘outside’ brutality to be seen, yet the intensity of the horror conveys all the 
way to the skin. It is an interkingdom that has not forcefully taken the body it has 
taken, but chosen it, become it, submitted to the evolution of involution, something 
spiraling inwards, entangling and interweaving. And it is also this kind of a fringe that 
attracts the becoming-animal. 
        Roger Ballen succeeds in creating bodies without organs by interrupting 
movement and separating distinct areas in the photographs, where an event or an act 
takes place. Furthermore, it is possible to read from the images actual becoming-
animals; turning a matter into a boneless meat. The human escapes Figures in Shadow 
Chamber as much as the animal begins to creep in on them, whether it is through 
exchanging organs, such as in Birdwoman, or refusing to eat like a human, such as in 
Lunchtime, or handing over power such as in Ratman; in all of them the tension 
between being and becoming becomes evident. A change occurs also in the animal, 
such as in Ratman, where the rat begins to connect and to rule, or in Loner, where the 
dog has become the consort, the caretaker. In this sense, becoming-animal succeeds to 
embody also BwO, tame it back into a Figure, and become an Icon. 
        In Shadow Chamber, the pure intensity gives forth similar violence such as in 
Francis Bacon’s paintings. It is also in this violence that body without organs seems to 
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live; as a body of a masochist, the Figure in Lunchtime has sealed his mouth from 
functioning like an organ, and instead has entered a circle of postponing, in which he 
tries to elongate the pleasure of not eating, instead of inflicting pain of lacking 
something. It is in this body, where the great art takes place for Deleuze: the sensation 
is in the body; in the body of an apple, or in this case, a body of, maybe a cat. Flows of 
intensity, affects, sensations and virtual have replaced the world of the subject. 
Becoming-animal has replaced an individual. In this light it is not a surprise that 
Deleuze and Guattari are sometimes of being accused of coldness in their philosophy, 
it is sometimes very difficult to identify with their flow of thinking as well as the 
content of it. However, I would consider it as a luck that in the case of Shadow 
Chamber a point of view so precise as well as fluid, gives tools to work through very 
difficult art of Ballen. 
        The reason why I have chosen to navigate through Deleuze’s thinking in this way 
has a lot to do with what I think conclusive in his philosophy. Both becoming-animal 
or a body without organs might alone constitute a very interesting subject to study, 
however without the dimension of immanence, towards which all Deleuze’ s thinking 
in some ways point, they would have a very little to do with Deleuze in the end. This is 
what I have found lacking in many of the commentaries I have read considering 
Deleuze and the arts; the discussion about the immanence of art is many times buried 
under the heavy machinery of Deleuzian vocabulary, when in the end, they all are 
there to aid the emergence of immanence. 
        In some sense I feel immanence is a little bit oldfashioned theme in the field of 
arts today, especially when compared to transcendence; the ‘sameness’ does not have 
the same appeal as in ‘otherness’, to put it bluntly. The plane of immanence is a life of 
an un-individual, belongs to no-one else except to itself. It is the immanence of 
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immanence, beyond a being or an act; a consciousness that is not referring anything 
but in itself, a life. It is from this sphere that I locate the purpose of Shadow Chamber: 
it is. It simply ‘is’. In immanence I find two interesting notions. First the new type of 
materialism proposed by Janne Vanhanen, in which I feel the aesthetic ‘body’ belongs 
to; somewhere beyond interiority or exteriority. Secondly the univocity of being that 
implies not only to monoism, but to plurality as well: it is sameness in infinite 
difference. It is also in univocity I find an appealing thought of ethics that applies to 
Shadow Chamber well; the ‘is’ unites God, a man and a flea together. 
        My aim has been to narrow down the massive flow of Deleuze’s individual and 
collaborative work into a little current, a small thread of my own thinking. What I have 
noticed throughout my reading process is that although there are hundreds of books 
written on Deleuze, most of them are commentaries on his philosophy and in the end 
turned out to be unhelpful in my attempt to ‘work’ the concepts instead of redefining 
them against other redefinitions. I do not mean to sound disrespectful with this notion, 
only a little disappointed. I came across only a few attempts to holistically use his/their 
philosophy in actual analysis of artworks. On the other hand, during my own research I 
found out the wisdom in that decision; the more I read Deleuze, the harder it became to 
narrow down the persistently strengthening flow of the concepts. In this sense, I have 
been forced to leave out important concepts, which has left me feeling both anxious to 
continue reading Deleuze more as well as sad and incompetent of breaking the 
beautiful web he has weaved around the difficult field of arts. 
        The aim of this has not been to prove, but to propose a new kind of a role to a 
photograph, at least in the Deleuzian theory of arts. This role I wish to simply 
reconsider the expressive equivalence of a photograph to a painting; a photograph as a 
relevant medium to convey the intensive reality of virtual. I feel that this needs to be 
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discussed more, because the boundaries between different artforms have collapsed, 
and as an artform photography evolves constantly. It is not only the challenge of 
digitality that I am thinking, but also the boundaries between painting, sculpture and 
photography; a subject I would have liked, but felt too extensive to study in the context 
of this thesis.  
        I think it is not coincide that Ratman begins the photobook of Shadow Chamber. 
It is, above all, an invitation of most kind by the man who holds in his hand the body 
of a power: Welcome to the realm of the brightest of lights and the deepest of shadows. 
In the light of this analysis, I cannot but to agree with Antonin Artaud, who says in To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God:  
 
To exist one need only let oneself be, 
but to live, 
one must be someone 
one must have a BONE, 
not to be afraid to show the bone, 
and to lose the meat in the process. 
(Artaud, 560) 
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